ISSUES OF NATIONAL AND FEDERATIVE RELATIONS

Academic journal

MIKHAILOV V.A.
Chairman of the Editorial Council, Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor, Head of the Department of National and Federative Relations of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation, a member of the Council for Interethnic Relations of the President of the Russian Federation

Editorial Board:

ABDULATIPOV R.G. Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

BOLTKENKOVA L.F. Doctor of Sciences (Law), Professor of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation

CASSIE NIGUSIE V. Michael Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor at the Chair of theory and history of international relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

DROBIZHEVA L.M. Doctor of Sciences (History), Head of the Center for Research of Interethnic Relations, Institute of Sociology FNISC RAS

GAIDUK V.V. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor, Bashkir State University

KANAPYANOVA R.M. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor at the Chair of international cultural cooperation, MGIK

KOSIKOV I.G. Doctor of Sciences (History), Chief Researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences

KOZLOV G.Ya. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor, Ryazan State University named after S.A. Yesenin

MEDVEDEV N.P. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

MOSEIKINA M.N. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor at the Chair of Russian history, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

PERKOVA D.V. Candidate of Political Sciences, Executive Secretary of the Magazine

PONEDELKOVA A.V. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor, Vice-Rector for work with the authorities and institutions, Head of the Department of Political Science and Ethnic Policy of the South Russian Institute — a branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Service under the President of the Russian Federation

SLIZOVSKIY D.E. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia

SULEYMANOVA Sh.S. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

SYZDYKOV Zh.S. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor, Head of the Chair of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Institute of Asian and African countries, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Deputy editor-in-chief of the Magazine

TRAN HUU THAN Candidate of Political Sciences, Lecturer at the Faculty of Political theories, Quang Binh University in Quang Binh Province Vietnam

VASILENKO V.I. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), professor, deputy head of the department of history of the Russian state, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Service under the President of the Russian Federation

ZORIN V.Yu. Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Head of the Center for scientific interaction with public organizations, media and government authorities of the IEA RAS

Sh.S. SULEYMANOVA
Editor-in-chief of the Magazine,
Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences), Professor, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

© LLC “Publishing House “Science Today”, 2018

ESTABLISHED BY LLC “PUBLISHING HOUSE “SCIENCE TODAY”

The Journal is registered by the Federal Service for Supervision of Mass Media, Communications and Protection of Cultural Heritage

Reg. Number PI No. FS77—47487 of November 25, 2011

The Journal is published quarterly

The journal is included in the database of the Russian Science Citation Index

The Five-year Journal’s impact factor is 0,476

The Journal is included in Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory

Academic papers published in the journal undergo obligatory editorial checking

The authors’ opinion not always coincides with the opinion of the Editorial Board

At reprint of the article or a part of it the reference to the Journal is obligatory

Address of the editorial office:
10, Zagoryevskaya street, building 4, office 4, Moscow, Russia, 115598
Tel: (910) 463-53-42
E-mail: etnopolitolog@yandex.ru

Executive Secretary
Perkova D.V.

Computer-aided makeup by
Antiferova A.S.

Translated by
Chernysheva E.V.

Signed for printing on 25.12.2018

Format 60х84/16. Offset paper. Offset print.

Number of printed sheets 49151.

Circulation 500 copies.

Order 0000.

Printed at the LLC “PrintUP”
Nagorny drive, 12c1,
Moscow, Russia, 117105
Tel.: +7 (495) 925-00-06
Academic journal “Issues of National and Federative Relations” is an international peer-reviewed scientific periodical in the field of political studies. The journal has an international character because of the composition of its Editorial Board, its editors, its contributing authors and topics of its publications.

The scientific journal is published since 2011 at the “Publishing House “Science Today”. Translated (eng.) version of the journal is published since 2018. Since its inception, the journal was guided by high scientific and ethical standards and today it is one of the leading political science journals in Russia.

The purpose of the journal is to promote scientific exchange and cooperation between Russian and foreign political scientists.

The journal is intended for the publication of the results of fundamental and applied scientific research. Thematic focus of the journal is reflected in the following permanent headings: “Domestic history, ethnology and ethnography”, “History of international relations and world politics”, “History and philosophy of politics”, “Political institutions, processes and technologies”, “Political culture, ethnopolitics and ideologies”, “Political problems of international relations and globalization.”

Format of publications: scientific articles, reviews, scientific materials, materials of round tables, scientific reviews, scientific reports devoted to research problems in the field of politics and political science.

The Editorial Board and the editors of the journal in their activities are guided by the principles defined by VAK of Russia for scientific journals, including: presence of the institute of peer review for the expert quality assessment of scientific articles; information openness of the publications; availability and compliance with the rules and ethical standards for the submission of manuscripts by the authors.

The target audience of the journal is Russian and foreign specialists-political scientists, as well as graduate students and masters in the fields of political science, state and municipal management and international relations.

The journal strictly adheres to the international publishing standards and publication ethics identified in the COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics) document. [http://publicationethics.org](http://publicationethics.org).

Full details of the journal and its editorial policy, requirements to the preparation and publication of articles, archive (issues since 2011) and additional information are available on the website: [http://etnopolitolog.ru](http://etnopolitolog.ru)

E-mail address: etnopolitolog@yandex.ru
CONTENTS

HISTORY OF RUSSIA: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSION

Medvedev N.P. Political History of the 90's. Notes of the Russian Deputy ............... 5
Panteleev V.I., Voronov I.I. Stolypin's Project
of Updating the Agrarian System of Siberia and its Fate................................. 10
Bessonova T.V. Structural and Typological Characteristics
of the Russian Meshchan Family in Kazan in the Middle of the XIX Century........ 21
Potapova I.V. Japanese Prisoners of the Second World War
in the Khabarovsk Territory.............................................................................. 29

ISSUES OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND POST-SOVET REINTEGRATION

Drobizheva L.M. Russian Civil Identity in Scientific
and Political Discussions and Public Opinion................................................. 34

HISTORY AND MODERN PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mekhdiev E.T. Energy Efficiency in Azerbaijan:
the Case of a Renewable Energy.................................................................... 45

REVIEWS

Slisovskiy D.E., Medvedev N.P. Review
of L.F. Boltenkova's Article “Historical Basis of Russianness” ....................... 54

OUR AUTHORS.................................................................................................. 60

AUTHORS’ GUIDELINES.................................................................................. 61
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE 90'S.
NOTES OF THE RUSSIAN DEPUTY

The article by the eyewitness and direct participant of the events describes the political intrigues and events of 1991 related to the adoption by the first democratic Parliament of Russia (Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) of the Law “On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples” and the political consequences of such a decision. The author gives characteristic of the situation that reigned at that time among the people’s deputies and in the White House where the Russian Parliament sat.

Key words: people's deputy of the RSFSR, the first democratic Parliament of Russia (Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation), elections of the first President of Russia, repressed peoples, rehabilitation, North Caucasus.

The first democratic Parliament (Supreme Soviet) of Russia consisted of two chambers: the Council of Nationalities and the Council of the Republic. Some time before, I was elected Chairman of the Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Parliament of the Russian Federation and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. The Presidium of the Supreme Council consisted of the Chairman of the Supreme Council, his deputies, the Presidents of the Chambers and the Chairmen of the Parliamentary Commissions and Committees. This permanent operating body of the Parliament was sometimes called the collective President of Russia. But, that was before the election of the first President of Russia. After the popular election of the President of Russia, the balance of power has changed dramatically. As the Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission of the Supreme Council of Russia on national-state structure and interethnic relations, it was very important for me to get closer to the members of the commission in order to make constructive decisions. The commission included leaders of four deputy factions (U. Temirov from “Sovereignty and Equality”, A. Golovin from “Change is a New Politics”, B. Tarasov from “Fatherland” and V. Bokov from “Communists of Russia”). Bringing their opinions to a common denominator

1 Medvedev Nikolai Pavlovich, People’s Deputy of Russia, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on national-state structure and interethnic relations (1990-1993).
was not easy. Sometimes it came to direct insults, especially when issues of interethnic relations were discussed. Once an emergency happened, it was literally a brawl between representatives of the North Ossetia and Chechen-Ingush delegations. It was at the time when Article 6 of the Law was considered, which determined the procedure for the territorial rehabilitation of the repressed peoples. I was forced to interrupt the meeting of the parliamentary commission, asking the press not to write about this incident.

Serious, persistent efforts to enact the Law were made by representatives of Chechen-Ingushetia, Kalmykia and other repressed peoples. The Law was adopted, but its wording made its implementation very problematic. The main difficulty was precisely in the ill-fated Article 6 related to territorial rehabilitation. In practice, it meant, for example, that the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia was to be transferred to Ingushetia. And this territorial problem was precisely one of the reasons for the bloody armed conflict between the Ingush and Ossetians. But at that time, the situation in the Supreme Council was such that in a number of cases the adoption of laws was dictated by emotions rather than reason. The discussion of that Law was so heated that R.I. Khasbulatov, who presided over that day at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, had to submit to the vote an incomplete document.

I could not speak openly against Article 6 and tried to smooth out sharp corners, in particular, I proposed to adopt a special resolution on the phased entry of the Law into force. Unfortunately, in the heat of passion, the proposal was ignored. The Chechen delegation, to put it mildly, showed incredible persistence, psychologically persistently crushing each deputy with references to the Stalinist genocide: “you are supposed to restore justice.” Under such a “press” the Law passed the first and second readings. An alarming thought did not leave me: do people really not see what the Law, in which such a “mine” is embedded, can lead to?

A month before the adoption of the Law, in March 1991, Boris Yeltsin asked me to go and personally meet with Doku Zavgaev, first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Party Committee and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic. At the same time, it was necessary to make an attempt to establish contacts with Dzhokhar Dudaev, the leader of the Congress of the Chechen people. I flew to Grozny on Saturday. I was brought from the airport to a two-story guesthouse surrounded by a high wall. During a short conversation with Zavgaev, when the stay program was discussed, I asked to include a meeting with Dudaev in it. Doku Gapurovich literally twitched, he took it almost as a personal insult:

– We respect the requests of our guests, but I ask you not to do this. Why do you, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, meet with political punks? Too much honor ... We will deal with them in the very near future.

I was compelled, respecting Caucasian customs, to reckon with the opinion of the host, who at that time had not yet taken Dudaev seriously. Only a few months passed, and the situation changed radically.
Political History of the 90’s. Notes of the Russian Deputy

Grozny gave the impression of a calm, peaceful city, although from time to time clashes between the Cossacks and Chechens occurred on the territory of the republic. Two weeks before my arrival, several Cossacks were killed. The local law enforcement authorities were reluctant in carrying out the investigation, and the federal investigating authorities complained about the lack of evidence.

A. Galazov was supposed to fly to Moscow from Vladikavkaz with me, but it turned out that D. Zavgaev was with us. It was an ordinary flight. A rich table was laid at the airport, at which Zavgaev and Galazov were sitting nearby, although the Prigorodny district was becoming a “hot spot” even then. While making a toast, I noted that the leaders of North Ossetia and Chechen-Ingushetia are sitting at the same table. That was important – let it always be so... Zavgaev then corrected me:

– You apparently do not know our laws. We can quarrel during the day, and sit at the same table in the evening...

Alas, further events have shown that these traditions of peace and good neighborliness were not so sacred. The brutality of the clashes between Ossetians and Ingush in the autumn of 1992 shocked the country: destroyed houses, hundreds of dead. The tragedy was provoked to a considerable degree by the adoption of the ill-fated Law. Boris Nikolaevich who usually intuitively felt such dangers, in that case, unfortunately, could not predict all the consequences.

The fact is that 15 minutes before the plenary session of the Supreme Soviet, where I was to give a report on the bill, I asked Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin to receive me for a private conversation. He said, “Come in.” But for some reason he invited R. Abdulatipov to join us. Frank conversation did not work. I tried to convince that the bill should not be adopted even in the first reading. I proposed to limit everything to my report, to state that the bill was submitted on time, but in no case to adopt any documents. Yeltsin agreed. But as soon as I got out, Khasbulatov appeared in his office, and, apparently, they had a different conversation. Ruslan Imranovich must have convinced the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet that the Law should have been adopted right then. As I was later told, Khasbulatov, having visited his constituency in Chechen-Ingushetia, vowed to do everything possible to adopt the Law before the presidential elections. I was unaware of such nuances and agreements reached. I concluded my report saying that the bill had a lot of internal contradictions, primarily regarding territorial rehabilitation. The norms laid down in it actually led to repressions and the resettlement of another people – the Ossetians. On the Russian scale, it concerned not only the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia, but also Kalmykia’s claims to two districts of the Astrakhan region, the territorial problems of the Balkars, and Karachays, which, of course, could not but worry. Moreover, the Cossacks also actively participated in this process, insisting that the Law should refer them to the repressed peoples. No matter how I argued that the Cossacks are not an ethnic group, but a social stratum of the Russian people, I could not convince them. It got to the point that the Cossack deputies began to almost deny their belonging to the Russians, demanding that their nationality is entered in their passports as Cossack!
This was theater of the absurd!

At the most critical moment of the discussion of the bill, Boris Nikolaevich unexpectedly left the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet R.I. Khasbulatov took the chair. He immediately put the question on the adoption of the Law in the first reading to the vote. A large group of Chechens and Ingush, who were on the balcony as guests, created such an atmosphere in the hall that many deputies did not dare to vote “against,” as if a sword of Damocles hung over them. Thus, the bill was passed in first reading.

I was indignant at this turn of events, but Yeltsin began to reassure me:

– Soon there will be elections, and the whole North Caucasus will vote for me after that ...

Then very quickly – almost overnight – my opponents prepared amendments for the second reading. They included Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the committee on legislation, and Mikhail Mityukov, his deputy, in the work. It was another attempt to break my resistance. But most of all I was outraged by the fact that in the second reading Vladimir Shumeyko, at that time an ordinary member of the Supreme Soviet, proposed amending the text of the Law related to the rehabilitation of the Cossacks. Amendments were usually submitted in writing and that one, in violation of everything, was voted “live.” After that, I published a long article “Can history be turned back?” in the newspaper Caucasian Krai, where I sharply criticized the position of Yeltsin and Shumeyko, who pursued narrow-minded, opportunistic goals with the proposed amendment. This is another confirmation that in the Supreme Soviet of Russia the emotional attitude and politics went ahead of law and sober reasoning...

As for Yeltsin’s forecast, it turned out to be true: in the presidential elections, residents of the Caucasian republics, primarily Chechens and Ingush, almost unanimously voted for him. But Ossetians were really indignant. Their previously calm, confident life was filled with anxiety. Unfortunately, the negative consequences of that legislative act have not been overcome so far. It is difficult to argue that if this Law had not been passed, tragic events would not have occurred. Sooner or later history avenges carelessness. Although, I’m sure that a way out of a complicated situation could have been less conflicting...

The rehabilitation of the repressed peoples confirmed the democratic course of the new leadership of Russia to correct the “mutilations” of the totalitarian regime. But at the same time, it also confirmed another truth: history cannot be turned back. This was vividly illustrated by the subsequent events in modern Russia.

NOTES:

REFERENCES:

STOLYPIN'S PROJECT OF UPDATING THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM OF SIBERIA AND ITS FATE

The article analyzes activities of the tsarist government in reforming land relations and introducing private land ownership in Siberia in the years of the Stolypin agrarian reform. In a generalized form, the Stolypin program for the modernization of the land relations in Siberia was reflected in the “Memo” compiled after the 1910 trip to Siberia of P.A. Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and A.V. Krivoshein, Chief Administrative officer for land management and agriculture. But there was not enough time for the development of legislation necessary for the implementation of this program.

The main reason for the slowing down of the reform was the resistance of multi-vector political forces, both from the right and the left. Both, the opposition parties represented by the deputies of the State Duma from Siberia and a significant part of the ruling class represented in the Russian Government opposed introduction of private land ownership in Siberia. However, as the analysis shows, a significant part of the rural population of Siberia, both old-timers and newcomers (resettlers) were supporters of the Stolypin reforms.

Key words: Siberia, land, agrarian reform, modernization, resettlement, private ownership, P.A. Stolypin, A.V. Krivoshein.

The topic of land relation reforms in Siberia at the beginning of the XX century is actively developed by today historians [5. Pp. 87-94]. The law-making and organizational activities of the tsarist government aimed at modernization of the agrarian system and introduction of private land ownership in Siberia during the Stolypin agrarian reform is of particular interest in this regard.

Of the latest works on this topic, we would like to single out the book by A.A. Hramkov [6. P. 328], as well as a collective monograph “Projects of transfor-
mation of the agricultural system in Siberia in the XX century: the choice of ways and methods of modernization” [13. P. 298]. A special chapter in it is devoted to the Stolypin project for reforming the Siberian village. Certain aspects of the problem were also considered in our publications [12. P. 156; 28. Pp. 220-238].

The purpose of this article is, without repeating the predecessors, to reveal the main features of the program aimed at updating the Siberian agricultural system and developed under the guidance of P.A. Stolypin, as well as outline the measures taken by the government for its implementation.

P.A. Stolypin and A.V. Krivoshein, Chief Administrative officer for land management and agriculture, who was Stolypin’s right hand man in the implementation of the land reform, were supporters of not just resettlement, but of settlement of Siberia [8. P. 264]. Addressing the Third Duma, Krivoshein said that the government viewed resettlement not as “a means of resolution of the land issue in the central provinces” by evicting the working masses of the peasantry to the outskirts, but as “a means of settling the latter by the economically wealthy Russian people and of their durable placement in the new places” [11. P. 100].

Memo Regarding the Trip to Siberia. An important step in the implementation of these plans was a trip by P.A. Stolypin and A.V. Krivoshein to Siberia in the late August – early September of 1910. It is not so important now that the two page draft report on the results of the trip submitted personally to the Tsar and the 127-page appendix to it, published in the form of a Memo in a separate book, were written by I.I. Tkhorzhevsky, the right hand man and, in modern language, A.V. Krivoshein’s speech writer, before the ministers’ trip beyond the Ural [29. P. 446].

In the end, what matters is not who writes the text for statesmen, but what they sign.

“The main wealth and power of the state is not the treasury or state property, it’s the population that’s becoming wealthier and stronger,” read the Memo.

“It is necessary in Siberia as firmly as in the European Russia,” the ministers emphasized, “to take the path of creating and strengthening private property” [1. P. 58, 59].

The Memo contained a comprehensive program of updating, or in modern terms, modernizing land relations in Siberia. First of all, it was proposed that during the land survey land plots should be allotted to the villages of old-timers and resettlers in the region not for use, but for ownership. For the peasants to be able to become sole owners, the task was set to carry out intra-land survey. In the areas most favorable for settlement, it was planned to start selling land to the newcomers. This measure was not dictated by fiscal interests. The newcomers were especially willing to settle in the relatively densely populated areas of Western Siberia. It was important for the government to direct the resettlement flow to the less populated territories of Eastern Siberia.

P.A. Stolypin and A.V. Krivoshein understood that “solely agricultural and solely peasant” Siberia would not be able to develop really quickly and success-
fully. With no right to buy land, Siberian entrepreneurs were forced to rent it from the treasury or peasants, thereby falling into dependence of the turns of the government agrarian policy or the mood of the rural communities.

It was important to assist the inflow of capital to Siberia. For this purpose P.A. Stolypin and A.V. Krivoshein put forward the task of revising the law of June 8, 1901 in order to eliminate complex formalities and class restrictions to the sale and long-term lease (up to 99 years) of large land plots. The law provided for the appropriate benefits only for the nobility, which caused sharp criticism from the opposition, including V.I. Lenin, who defined the essence of the law as “the embezzlement of the treasury by the nobles” [9. P. 90, 91].

Therefore, the Memo put forward the task of creating conditions for the formation, along with the small-peasant farms, of large private land holdings and removal of class restrictions on the sale and long-term lease (up to 99 years) of large land plots.

The growth of Siberia should have been promoted also by measures aimed at providing its economy with reliable sales markets. To solve this problem it was envisaged to start large-scale construction of new railways, a course was taken to cancel the so-called Chelyabinsk tariff change, which made difficult the sale of Siberian grain in the European part of Russia if it was transported by rail [9. Pp. 126-130].

**Land Management Bill.** In November 1910, the Main Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture sent to the State Duma a draft law “Regulation on the land settlement of peasants and alliens on the state lands of Siberian provinces and regions.” In accordance with it, land was granted to the Siberian villagers for ownership without payment. True, the state retained the right to the subsoil. The government refused to give the villagers the right to own forests, they should, as before, remain in state ownership.

By that time, work on the survey of the state lands according to the laws of the late 19th and very early 20th centuries had not yet been completed in Siberia. And where the state and peasant lands were not demarcated, it was inexpedient to start internal monitoring.

Therefore, according to the draft law, land was given into the ownership of peasant communities, only one family farms who lived away from the village received land in their sole disposal [15. P. 41, 42].

The State Duma at a general meeting decided to transfer the bill to the land commission for a consideration. The commission, in turn, instructed its second sub-commission to consider the bill.

The review process is described in detail in the article by M.T. Kogut [7. Pp. 29-39]. We supplement this story with archival materials from the Russian State Historical Archive.

Deputies of the State Duma from Siberia at a meeting of their parliamentary group, despite some differences in assessments, spoke out against the Bill.
Among the Siberian deputies there were no members of the Duma second land sub-commission, but they were given the right to participate in its meetings with an advisory vote [7. Pp. 34-35].

The second land subcommission began to discuss the project of Siberian land management on February 3, 1911. Speaker, Count I.I. Kapnist, immediately proposed an article-by-article review of the bill. However, the Duma deputy from the Irkutsk province, the social democrat Terenty Belousov and the influential Trudovik from the Tobolsk province Vladimir Dzyubinsky insisted on the opening of a general debate.

Then, the head of the Resettlement Department, full councillor G.V. Glinka took the floor: “No one will work for someone else’s interest, on the land that is not their,” he said, justifying the need for an early introduction of private land ownership in Siberia. Concluding his speech, the head of the Siberian Prikaz emphasized that “there is no reason to doubt the timeliness and suitability of the Bill being examined.”

The Siberian deputies did not like this wording. “Siberia lives its own life perfectly ... and there’s no need to change its system,” Belousov proclaimed. Nikolai Skalozubov saw loopholes in the Bill to create landowner tenure in the province. The deputy from the Tobolsk province Vladimir Dzyubinsky added that Siberian old-timers “do not ask for any land management from the government”, and the deputy from the Tobolsk province cadet Konstantin Molodtsov suggested that if the Bill is adopted, the poorest peasants would intensly loose their land. The cadet from Transbaikalia Nikolai Volkov also spoke out against the Bill. All Siberian deputies unanimously reiterated that the peasants of the eastern outskirts were ardent opponents of private land ownership.

However, the Siberian parliamentarians did not outnumber their opponents. Count I.I. Kapnist, representatives of various departments: G.F. Chirkin, P.V. Dzenkovsky and others supported completely opposite considerations. The political aspect was also taken into account. “Fusion of the population with Siberia is possible, of course, only if the land they occupy is assigned to the population,” said I.I. Tkhorzhevsky. The official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs D.I. Pestrzhetsky noted that private ownership of land in the region is necessary to guarantee a lasting consolidation of Siberia with Russia. “... We must save Siberia, we must make it one and strong, otherwise it will be taken away from us earlier than we can even expect,” he said.

As a result, in February 1911, with the seven votes to one, the second land sub-commission of the State Duma adopted the following wording: “The lands of Siberian peasants and alliens allotted to them and being allotted to them shall be transferred to them with the destruction of the title of state property” [15. L. 41-50]. In the following days, the sub-commission engaged in an article-by-article discussion of the Bill, but did not have time to approve it before the end of the powers of the deputies of the Third Duma.
The “inhibition” of the Bill in the subcommission was also due to the fact that the attitude towards it in the right-wing groups, close to the government, was ambiguous.

The Ministers of the Court and Finance opposed the “transfer of state and cabinet land to private ownership of peasants.” According to the Minister of Finance, this measure could become an overwhelming financial burden for the country [23. P. 135].

The second land subcomission of the Fourth State Duma began to discuss the draft law on Siberian land management in March 1913. The Siberian deputies of the Fourth Duma, like their predecessors in the parliamentary group, were negative in respect of the introduction of private land ownership in Siberia. The discussion of the draft law on Siberian land management in the subcommission was going on very slowly. Only in March 1914, this work was completed. However, soon the Duma went on vacation, and then the world war began ... On January 29, 1916, the Minister of Agriculture Naumov petitioned the Chairman of the Duma M.V. Rodzianko requesting him to put for consideration the Bill on land management of peasants in Siberia at the general meeting of the Russian parliament [7. P. 38]. The request was not granted.

Intra-land Survey. At the same time, the government pursued a policy objectively preparing the introduction of private land ownership in Siberia. On November 3, 1910 P.A. Stolypin sent a circular to the Siberian governors, in which he demanded “without allowing any violence against the will of the old-timers or new settlers, help the rural communities with the transfer of communal land from use to private ownership” [12. P. 30].

From the end of 1910, work on the intra-land survey in the interests of the Siberian rural population accelerated sharply. By 1916, in Siberia, 290 thousand old-time households, that is about a fourth of the total number, filed motions for an intra-household land survey. Almost every tenth householder from among them managed to become sole owner [24. P. 236].

There were not enough state surveyors. But this did not stop the villagers. It became common practice that at rural gatherings, especially in the Tomsk province, peasants made decisions to hire private land surveyors, sometimes at inflated prices, in order to quickly divide the land.

Head of Zemsky department of the Ministry of the Interior Y. Ya. Litvinov, who visited the Tomsk province in the summer of 1911, was struck by this phenomenon. Speaking at a meeting of the provincial administration, he defined its reason: “While the division of allotments in the European Russia is caused by economic reasons ... in Siberia this question is raised by legal considerations, it has a legal basis. First of all, the Siberians want to get rid of those land disturbances and troubles that arise from the seizure of land ... They need to make land distribution as soon as possible to determine the land use” [12. P. 31].
This explanation is clearly incomplete. The lion’s share (about four fifths) of the Siberian peasants who have got allotments from the community were from the Tomsk province. The region was an undisputed leader in the number of migrants it accepted. In addition, it was much ahead of the rest of Siberia in the pace of land management according to the laws of the late 90s of the XIX century [6. P. 328]. Only those old-time villages where these works had been carried out had the right to conduct intra-land surveying.

In the European Russia, attempts of some peasants to organize separate farms often provoked serious resistance from the middle class villagers. The poor peasants sometimes were not against selling their land and going somewhere to earn money, and the kulaks hoped to increase their savings by becoming full-time sole owners, the middle class peasants were not ready for a radical change in their way of managing land, and, accordingly, opposed any attempts of allocation of separate farms.

In the conditions of Siberian comparative land abundance, redistribution of land within the communities was a rare and sometimes unknown phenomenon, and consequently local peasants had less obstacles when they wanted to have a separate land plot. It was the relative immaturity of the communities that made the Siberian peasants a reliable supporter of the Stolypin transformations.

The newcomers who settled in the resettlement sites did not have to wait until the completion of the land survey before submitting applications for an intra-land survey. In addition, the Main Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture has developed measures to stimulate the migrants to carry out work on intra-land survey. In particular, cash bonuses for forest clearing in the plots were issued only to those new settlers who had single-use plots. Migrants who moved to the separate farms received loan assistance, etc. [10. Pp. 40-53]. Therefore, in the resettlement villages, intra-land surveys proceeded on a relatively wide scale. By January 1, 1916, intra-land surveying in the Yenisei province was completed in 118 villages, of which only three villages were old-timers and the rest were new-comers [16. P. 16].

From our point of view, we cannot agree with the conclusion of M.V. Shilovsky that the Stolypin “agrarian reform was not supported from below in Siberia, also because of the desire of the peasants to preserve the communities” [17. P. 21]. More right is D.N. Belyanin, who specially studied the process of conducting intra-land surveys in Western Siberia and came to a clear conclusion: “the facts refute the assertion that the policy of intra-land surveying was not supported by the peasantry of Western Siberia” [2. Pp. 38-47].

**New Leasing Terms.** In March 1911, the Council of Ministers adopted the Regulation “On the Allocation of Separate Farm Plots to Resettlers to Private Ownership.” This project did not become law, being stuck in the State Duma. However, it was possible to transfer sole plots to the newcomers not to ownership, but to use, without adopting a law. As a result, the Resettlement Department took
a course on developing separate farms for use. In accordance with the instruction adopted in March 1911, it was prescribed to assign farm sites to the newcomers in the best places [26. P. 237].

In February 1912, the State Duma received two more bills aimed at creating and distributing private land ownership in Siberia. One of them provided for the transfer of land plots to the newcomers for preferential rent with the right of their subsequent redemption, and the other provided for measures to attract private entrepreneurs to develop empty land. These projects were forever stuck in the Duma commissions.

At the same time, the government took measures to implement the ideas set forth in the projects. At the end of 1912, the Rules on the leasing of resettlement areas intended for sale beyond the Urals came into force. Under the terms of the lease, approved on March 30, 1913 by A.V. Krivoshein in the development of these Rules, in Asian Russia resettlement areas intended for sale, “until the law on the sale of them are issued,” were transferred to prosperous new-comers without bidding for up to 12 years with the subsequent repurchase right [18. Pp. 78-85; 25].

Already in 1913, 3,869 such plots with a total area of 134,479 tiths were prepared in Tobolsk province, Akmola and Turgai regions, and 371 of them (14,120 tiths) were leased. In Eastern Siberia, the rules on the leasing of resettlement sites have not been applied [19. Pp. 346-347; 27. P. 48]. This practice has been applied in Western Siberia. However, having sent their main workers to the world war, the resettlement farms in the areas intended for sale did not manage to get stronger. By 1917, about half of them in Tobolsk province had large arrears of rent [21. Pp. 14, 15].

In 1911, they developed a new version of the law of June 8, 1901 “On attracting private enterprise to the development of wasted state land in sparsely populated areas”. Its distinctive feature was that not only nobles, but also persons of other classes could rent large tracts of state land on concessional terms. The project was not approved by the State Duma and did not become law, but the principle of providing preferential rents to large entrepreneurs still found application.

On January 29 and February 15, 1913, Minister of Justice Ivan Shcheglovitov and Chief Administrative officer for land management and agriculture Alexander Krivoshein approved the Interim Rules on the leasing of plots of state land for horse and cattle breeding in Asian Russia. In accordance with the Rules, land was leased at preferential rates without bidding for a period of up to 36 years to “mainly wealthy herders, regardless of their class origin” [22. Pp. 57-58].

By 1917, in the Irkutsk, Yenisei, Tobolsk and Tomsk provinces of 55 plots prepared for cultural cattle breeding with a total area of 168.4 thousand te, only 17 plots with an area of 82.7 thousand tiths were leased [4. P. 220-249].

The largest sheep farm of this type was the partnership of “Siberian Economies” of Alekseev and Chetverikov, which rented 57.2 thousand tiths of land in four sections in the Yenisei province in 1917. The largest of these sites was lo-
cated near the healing lake Uchum in the modern Uzhur district. The partnership had 330 workers and employees and kept about 40 thousand heads of high-breed merino sheep [3. Pp. 61-65].

In general, the Rules on leasing state land for cattle breeding, of course, contributed to the inflow of capital to agriculture in Siberia.

Of considerable importance for the entrepreneurial activity and normalization of land relations in commercial – industrial villages were also the Rules approved on February 20 and March 6, 1913 by Ivan Scheglovitov and Alexander Krivoshein on the lease of land plots for construction in Asian Russia (without the Far East) in the railway and other settlements of urban type. In accordance with the Rules, manor plots were rented out without a tender into a 36-year lease with the right to purchase land when the villages were transformed into towns [14. L. 47-52].

Thanks to the Rules, residents of urban-type settlements received more solid land status, because earlier they were significantly dependent on officials of the treasury department, who had the right to increase rents at virtually any time. The tenant of the land was also not guaranteed that the land leased by him at the auction would not be transferred to another owner [20. P. 57]. Ultimately, this government measure could become the basis for the introduction of private land ownership in urban settlements.

Thus, it is hardly fair to say that after the death of P.A. Stolypin, the implementation of the agrarian reform, named after him, was suspended. A.V. Krivoshein was a worthy successor to P.A. Stolypin.

In a generalized form, the Stolypin program for the modernization of land relations in Siberia, the creation and development of the institution of private land ownership in the Urals, was reflected in the Memo compiled following the results of the ministers’ trip to Siberia. However, legislative prerequisites for the implementation of this program did not manage to take shape.

The main reason for the inhibition of reform was the resistance of diverse political forces, both on the right and on the left. Both opposition parties represented by deputies of the State Duma from Siberia and a significant part of the ruling class represented in the Russian government opposed the introduction of private land ownership in Siberia. However, as the analysis shows, a significant part of the rural population of Siberia, both old-timers and newcomers, were supporters of the Stolypin transformations. This was vividly revealed by the clearly favorable attitude of the peasants to the intra-land survey carried out in accordance with the Stolypin’s instructions.

It should also be noted that during the years of the Stolypin agrarian reform, serious measures were taken to create not only small-peasant, but also large private landholdings beyond the Urals without class restrictions.

Steps were also taken to create the institution of private land ownership in the cities of the Asian part of the country.
REFERENCES:


2. Belyanin D.N. The results of intra-land demarcation in Western Siberia at the beginning of the 20th century [Itogi vnutrinadel’nogo razmezhevaniya v Zapadnoy Sibiri v nachale XX v.] // Bulletin of Altai State University. 2010. No. 4-1 (68) (In Russ.).


11. Ostrovsky I.V. P.A. Stolypin and his time [P.A. Stolypin i yego vremya]. Novosibirsk, 1992 (In Russ.).


13. Projects for the transformation of the agricultural system of Siberia in the XX century: the choice of ways and methods of modernization [Projekty preobrazovaniya agrarnogo stroya Sibiri v KHKH v.: vybor putey i metodov


25. Transbaikal regional sheets [Zabaykal’skiye oblastnyye vedomosti]. May 29, 1913 (In Russ.).


STRUCTURAL AND TYPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RUSSIAN MESHCHAN FAMILY IN KAZAN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE XIX CENTURY

The article examines the structural and typological characteristics of the Russian meshchan (in Russia: tax-paying urban commoners, including artisans, shopkeepers, homeowners, etc.) families in Kazan in the middle of the XIX century, on the eve of the Great Reforms. Based on the list of Kazan meshchan in 1858, a computer database of the city’s meshchan families was compiled. An analysis of this document made it possible to reconstruct such demographic characteristics as population, the ratio of men and women, the generational family structure, and the number of children per family. P. Lasletta’s methodology was applied in order to determine the typology of families, as a result of which the main types of Kazan meshchan households were determined. The obtained data indicate that the structural and quantitative characteristics of the meshchan families in Kazan in the middle of the XIX century approached the level that residents of many cities of Russia reached only towards the end of the century, when the bourgeois modernization was completed. This trend is characteristic for the industrially developed cities of Russia, where the developed urban lifestyle significantly influenced the social life of people.

Key words: meshchan family, demographic characteristics, family typology, number of family members, generational structure, number of children, household.

Russian meshchans as a social category appeared in the last quarter of the 18th century, as a result of a focused state policy to construct the social class structure. Being the largest group among urban residents, the meshchans were the bearers and creators of a special, urban way of life. It is the way of life, which includes the level, quality and lifestyle that determined the functioning of each concrete historical social group and its everyday life. At the same time, specific living practices of people, determined not only by the state policy, but also by the characteristics

1 The study was carried out with the financial support of the Russian Federal Property Fund in the framework of the scientific project No. 18-09-00353/18.
of the real spatial and ethno-cultural environment, influenced the lifestyle. The most important field of their intersection is such a social institution as the family. The family is the strongest link in society, which forms the way of life, preserves it and passes it from generation to generation. The main demographic events take place in the family: birth, marriage, death, and the behavioral attitudes, lifestyle and the fundamentals of worldview are laid down in the family, the mechanism of social inheritance works through the institution of the family [16. P. 11].

Study of the structure of the Russian meshchan families in Kazan in the middle of the XIX century makes it possible to reconstruct the basic demographic characteristics of the most massive layer of the urban population of the pre-reform Russia. Family structure includes the organization of relationships, which are called demographic [15. P. 37]. The structure of the family is understood as “a way of organizing relations between its elements (family members), the nature of their relationship in the process of socially significant activities” [5. P. 17]. The structure of a family in demography includes its composition, which is determined by the total number of the family members, number of generations and couples, number of children, relationships of kinship and property, etc. The study of the family structure is crucial for its classification and typology.

The main sources allowing to study the structure of Russian meshchan families in Kazan is the list of Kazan meshchans, compiled in the meshchan office in 1858. The document contains information about all the meshchans belonging to the Russian meshchan society in Kazan at the time of the 10th revision. Unfortunately, part of the document due to the poor preservation of some pages is impossible to read, but the vast majority of the content is available for research. The informational capabilities of this source provide a great field for the study of the meshchan families. The form of the document included much more complete information than was required for compiling the census returns and actually repeated the columns of the book of citizens. The list is based on the meshchan families present in Kazan at the time. All its members of each family were recorded indicating their name and surname, degree of kinship, gender and age, mentioning illegitimate children, foundlings, remarriages. House ownership was separately noted with an indication of the street and for those without their own housing it was specified where and with whom the family lived. The document contains information on the activities of the head of the family, as well as the activities of adult sons and brothers living in the family and their participation in public city services.

The source contains information about 2136 meshchan families of Kazan, with a total number of 7202 people. Such a significant amount of information justifies the need to use information technologies of computer source studies, successfully applied by Yu.M. Goncharov in his study of the merchant families in Western Siberia [7. P. 240]. Based on this source, a computer database of the meshchan families of Kazan was created, which aims not only to translate the source into machine-readable form, but also to optimally organize the information.
Structural and Typological Characteristics of the Russian Meshchan Family in Kazan in the Middle of the XIX Century

for resolving the research problems. The database has its own structure, which is based on the grouping of information into tables associated with a common key field that acts as an identifier.

When studying the structural and quantitative characteristics of the family, one of the important indicators is the number of family members. The quantitative composition of the family is directly related to the economic activity, living standards, and social status, and determines the life strategies of the family. The meshchan family in Russia was a kindred union of people united by the patrilineal kinship, the decisive criterion for belonging to the family was paternal kinship. The main trend in the late XVIII – first half of the XIX centuries was a reduction in the number of members in the urban families. B.N. Mironov noted that by 1897 the average family size of the urban population decreased compared with the first half of the 18th century from 6.2 to 4.2 people [11. P. 178].

The average number of members in meshchan families in Kazan in the middle of the XIX century was even lower, it was only 3.38 members, indicating an even higher rate of disintegration of the traditional large families. For instance, the middle class family in Siberian cities averaged 4 to 5 people [2. P. 147]. Often, researchers of the urban family analyze the general data for all urban residents, which somewhat distorts the idea of the middle class family. N.A. Minenko drew attention to the fact that the number and structure of townspeople families depended on the class affiliation and orientation of the economy [10. P. 177]. The number of members in a merchant family was bigger than that in meshchan families [6. P. 145]. For example, the number of members in a merchant family in Western Siberia by the middle of the XIX century was 5 to 6 people [17. P. 99], and 4.9 people in Ryazan by 1830 [8. P. 110]. At the end of the XIX century, the number of members in a meshchan family in Kazan remained at about mid-century level, i.e. 3.4 people [3. P. 78].

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of people in the family</th>
<th>Number of families</th>
<th>% of the total number of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>28,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>18,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>14,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>12,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 and more</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As is clear from the table, the largest number of families, almost a third of the total number, consisted of one person. Their number slightly decreased by the end of the century, but remained quite high, in 1898 the number of single member families among the Kazan meshchans was 25.8% [3. P. 78].

Another third of the total number (33%) were families of 2 to 3 people. Low number of members is directly related to the weakening of the patriarchal traditions and, at the same time, high mortality of the urban population, especially children. If the merchants represented a fairly prosperous layer of the urban population, the welfare of which allowed better living conditions (food, housing, etc.), the quality of life of the meshchans, the ordinary townspeople, was noticeably lower. “In many ways, urban life as such seems less favorable for people’s health and vitality than rural life: crowded housing, lack of clean air, difficulty in getting regular supply of fresh food, greater susceptibility to contagious diseases, etc.,” [13. P. 280] noted a researcher in population statistics in Russia.

The number of men in Kazan meshchan families was lower than that of women: 3277 men versus 3923 women, respectively, the average number of men was 1.5 and women 1.8 per family. The predominance of women in urban families was characteristic of pre-reform Russia, when the class system and serfdom hindered the influx of population into cities. By the end of the XIX century, in large cities of the European part of Russia the male population already prevailed, which N.A. Aralovets associates with the migration of the young able-bodied men to cities in connection with the growth of industrial production [1. P. 5].

Historical and demographic processes affected the generational structure of the families. Of the analyzed number of families, 477 (22.3%) were single-generation families. Two-generation families predominated; they accounted for almost half – 939 families (43.9%). 253 families (11.8%) consisted of three generations of relatives, only 10 families (0.5%) included 4 generations. The vast majority of single-generation families are young couples who have not yet had time to have children, or couples who have already raised their children, they accounted for 82% of the total number of such families. A small part was made up of families consisting of brothers and sisters. Two-generational families were married couples with children, or one parent raising children alone. In families of three generations, elderly parents lived with married children and their offspring.

The predominance of two-generation families in the structure of the urban family of the 19th century, an increase in the number of single-generation families, and an extremely small number of families with four generations were noted by various researchers [4. P. 112]. It is noteworthy that among the Kazan meshchan families there is a noticeably low number of three-generation families. So, according to Yu.M. Goncharov, in 1857, in Tobolsk and Barnaul three generation families constituted 21.8% and 25.5%, respectively, while in Kazan they constituted a little more than 10 percent. The higher rates of disintegration of complex patriarchal families and the simplification of their internal structure among the
Kazan meshchans indicate the activity of the industrial development processes in Kazan and the high rates of urbanization in the pre-reform era, as a result of which the influx of population into the cities grew and the level of development of the urban economy allowed large families to split up.

Among the Kazan meshchans, small families predominated. The table shows the data on the number of children in Kazan meshchan families; when calculating this indicator, all family and marriage units were taken into account, including those that were part of complex households consisting of several brotherly families.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is clear from the table, in most cases there were one, two or three children in the families, which is typical for the meshchans. The Kazan meshchans are distinguished by a high number of childless couples. According to researchers, in the middle of the XIX century, the number of such couples was much lower [2. P. 155]. This indicator also significantly affected the calculation of the average number of children in a family. With an account of childless couples, it amounted to only 1.7 children per family. But even if we take into account only families with children, then the average number of children will be only 2.2 per family. This is more typical for an urban family of the late XIX – early XX centuries, which is associated not only with the high child mortality, but also with a tendency to reduce fertility [1. P. 72].

Family relations in Russia were inseparable from the concept of home; in the understanding of people, family and household were synonymous. In the Russian Academy dictionary, the word “house” is mentioned in two senses: “1. Building for living, a dwelling; 2. As a collective name, it means all people who belong to the same family” [14. Pp. 724-725]. To study the forms of the family organization of the meshchans, it is most advisable to use the typology developed by P. Laslett, leader of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. The central concept is a household, which means a family group, united on the basis of cohabitation, common economic activity and family ties [9. P. 132]. The 1858 name-wise list of Kazan meshchans groups people precisely by households. According to the terminology of P. Laslett, a simple family household is what is usually called the nuclear family, it is based on a marital relationship. Such family consists of a married couple with offspring or a widow or widower with children. An extended family household is a married family together with relatives who are directly related to it. An additional family member may be a
representative of the older generation, in which case the family is considered ascendant. Having a grandson without parents, a nephew or a niece qualifies as a descending family. If there is a brother, sister or cousin of the head of the family, in this case the family expands along the side line. In the event several married families are united in a household, such a household is defined as a complex or multifocal household. The main indicator of a complex household is the presence of one or more family cells in addition to the main one made up by the head of the family. These secondary cells can be represented by a married couple of the head’s parents, as well as married sons. If the household unites the families of brothers or sisters, such a household belongs to the type of a complex fraternal household.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of households</th>
<th>Single person</th>
<th>Group of relatives</th>
<th>Complex</th>
<th>Complex fraternal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Widows</td>
<td>Maidens</td>
<td>Simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| %                  | 8,4 | 8,3   | 11,3    | 3,9   | 40,2     | 7,1    | 4,5

An analysis of the distribution of households demonstrates the predominance of simple nuclear families, which make up 40% of all households. Also noteworthy is the markedly high number of unmarried single people; they made up almost a third of the total number of families. Of the total number of single people, 179 (29.4%) were men, the rest were widows (178 people, 29.7%) or single women (242 people, 40.4%). The main reason for widowhood was the high mortality rate. In addition, men almost always remarried, while for widowed women, especially with children, it was extremely difficult. Another possible reason was that women married at a younger age than men and often outlived their spouses. In addition, S.A. Novoselsky, studying the issues of the urban and rural mortality in Russia, noted that “women in cities are less likely than men to suffer from many harmful effects of the urban life (harmful activities, alcoholism, etc.)” [12. P. 43]. For the young women, a significant obstacle to marriage was the lack of a proper dowry.

The number of extended and complex households is quite small. If the data in the table are compared with the internal structure of families in Tobolsk and Barnaul, given in the Yu.M. Goncharov’s study, then, according to his calculations, in the middle of the century there were approximately 20 to 25% of extended families, while among the Kazan meshchans there were only 16% of such families. A comparison with the industrially developed regions of European Russia gives a different picture. In 1850, in the Yaroslavl province, among the urban population, extended families accounted for only 6%, while the number of complex households approximately coincided with the data for Kazan: 13% [11. P. 234].
Thus, the structural and quantitative characteristics of the Kazan meshchan families in the middle of the XIX century approached the values that residents of many cities of Russia reached only towards the end of the century, when bourgeois modernization was completed. There was a process of nuclearization of families, simplification of their internal structure, the archaic forms of family organization were eliminated, which is reflected in the transition from a large patriarchal family to a small family with children. This trend was characteristic of the industrially developed cities of Russia with an urban lifestyle that significantly influenced the social life of people.

REFERENCES:


4. Frolova T.V. City family in the XIX century. (based on material from the cities of the Yaroslavl province) [Gorodskaya sem’ya v XIX v. (na materiale gorodov Yaroslavskoy gubernii)]. Thesis for the degree of Candidate of Sciences (history). Yaroslavl, 2008 (In Russ.).


7. Goncharov Yu.M. Merchant family of the second half of the XIX – beginning of XX centuries (based on materials from a computer database of merchant families in Western Siberia) [Kupecheskaya sem’ya 2-y poloviny XIX – nachala XX vv. (po materialam komp’yuternoy bazy dannых kupecheskih semey Zapadnoi Sibiri)]. M.: RAS. Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology; Altai State University, 1999 (In Russ.).


9. Laslett P. Family and household: a historical approach // Marriage, fertility, family for three centuries. Collection of articles [Sem’ya i domokhozyay-


12. *Novoselsky S.A.* Differences in urban and rural mortality in European Russia [*O razlichiyakh v smertnosti gorodskogo i sel’skogo naseleniya Yevropeyskoy Rossii*] // Public Doctor. 1911. No. 4 (In Russ.).


JAPANESE PRISONERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE KHABAROVSK TERRITORY

After the defeat and surrender of the Kwantung Army in September-August 1945, parts of the Soviet armed forces captured thousands of Japanese troops who were on the territory of the USSR and were sent to the rear camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the NKVD in 30 regions of the Soviet Union, including the Khabarovsk Territory. The article touches on the organization of camps and special hospitals for prisoners of war in the territory of the region, special attention is paid to their keeping in camp No. 5. The main attention is paid to the burial places of the camp, its departments and special hospitals, as well as the exhumation of the remains of Japanese citizens and their removal to Japan. The author, considering the issue of Japanese military burials, relies on the published sources and unpublished documents, mainly from the personal archive of Potapova Galina Nikitichna, who, since 1993, has been organizing direct visits of Japanese delegations, accompanying them in their trips around the region, and assisting them in the survey of the burial places of the Japanese citizens. The study of this problem is relevant for the understanding of the to-day relations and maintenance of good neighborly relations between Japan and Russia.

Key words: Second World War, camps and special hospitals for Japanese POWs, Khabarovsk Territory, examination of military graves and exhumation of the remains.

On September 2, 1945, hostilities in the Far Eastern region ended. The Soviet Armed Forces defeated the troops of imperialist Japan. As a result of the defeat and surrender of the Kwantung Army, 639,776 Japanese troops were captured by the Red Army in Korea, Manchuria and South Sakhalin and sent to the camps in 30 regions of the Soviet Union, including the Khabarovsk Territory [9].

By the decision of the USSR State Defense Committee about 170,000 Japanese POWs and internees were sent for keeping and labor use in the national economy in the Khabarovsk Territory [8]. According to the data of a military researcher, retired 2nd rank captain A.G. Merezhko, a total of 159,712 people were in camps and special hospitals in the Khabarovsk Territory on June 1, 1946, including 148 generals, 3,367 officers, 156,159 non-commissioned officers and privates [1]. According to the Report of the Head of the NKVD Directorate for the Khabarovsk Territory
I. Dolgikh dated August 10, 1946, 161,294 people were in special hospitals and camps in the Khabarovsk Territory as of August 1946 [10].

The formation of the camps, the reception, placement and maintenance of prisoners of war were entrusted by order of the NKVD of the USSR to the Office of the People’s Commissariat of the Interior – the Office of the Ministry of the Interior (UNKVD-UMVD) in the Khabarovsk Territory. During September-November 1945, 12 camp directorates were formed with 178 camp units and one special facility for keeping prisoners of war generals [7]. The camps were located in the areas of the Komsomolsk-Sovetskaya Gavan highway, at the stations of Kuldur, Tyra, Kato, Monguohto, Evoron, Khurmuli, Solnechny, Vanino, in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Khabarovsk and other areas.

The organization of the camps took place simultaneously with the reception of prisoners of war, most of them arrived in the period from September 15 to October 30, 1945, which created great difficulties. Personnel for the camps did not arrive by that time. For example, on October 1, 1945, there was an acute shortage of officers for all camps. Quartermasters began to arrive only in the second half of November. The Rear of the 2nd Far Eastern Front sent only 24 persons instead of 186 officers ordered by the Center. During the period from 1945 to 1947, there was a sharp lack of operational personnel.

The residential and auxiliary premises in the camps were not prepared for the placement and keeping of the POWs, the Fronts failed to comply with the Center’s instructions on supplying battalions of prisoners of war transferred to the NKVD rear camps with adequate supplies of food and clothing.

Along with the formation of the camps, the General Sanitary Directorate of the Soviet Army deployed 15 hospitals for the prisoners of war [7]. As of June 1, 1946, 7,563 Japanese prisoners of war were in the special hospitals of the Khabarovsk Territory [1]. The main problem for the hospitals was the lack of medical staff and translators, so Japanese were involved in serving the patients.

More than 50% of all POWs were held in camps Nos. from 1 to 5. Until 1948, these camps were part of the NKVD Main Directorate of Camps for Railway Construction (GULZhDS) and serviced its facilities. Heads of the Camp Directorates were at the same time Heads of the corresponding construction units of the GULZhDS system, and the heads of the camp departments were corresponding heads of the camp departments. Supply, financing, material support and accounting were carried out through a common network of relevant departments of Construction and Forced Labor Camps (ITL). The absence of an independent organizational structure at these camps negatively affected the fulfillment of the requirements of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for the keeping, labor use and preservation of their physical condition [7]. In 1948, camps No. 4 and 5 were separated into independent economic units, and the restructuring of relations with construction units on a contractual basis helped to improve all indicators for the keeping and labor use of prisoners of war.
Camp No. 5 was located in the city of Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk Territory, with branches on the Urgal-Komsomolsk highway. In accordance with order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East A.M. Vasilevsky of September 4, 1945, 5,000 prisoners of war were brought there by water by the 1st Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet from the areas of Manchuria and North Korea [5. P. 25]. Japanese prisoners of war came from the front-line receiving and forwarding points located in the town of Mudanjiang and settlement Echo (Manchuria). In total, 20,368 prisoners of war were delivered to camp No. 5, including: 1,664 officers, 5,299 non-commissioned officers and 14,905 privates. The camp kept not only the Japanese. According to M. Kuzmina, from October to December 1949, there were 45,846 Japanese, 23 Chinese, 16 Mongols and 7 Koreans. The incoming contingent was constantly in motion [5. P. 26].

The administration of camp No. 5 was located in the village of Khurmuli of the Solnechny District and on March 1, 1947 had 5 departments with camp points: department 1 was in the city of Komsomolsk (8 camp sites (c/s) – 2,500 people), village Khurmuli (14 c/s – 4,000 people), Evoron (12 c/s – 6,000 people), Duki (4 c/s – 3,200 people) and Mavinsky (5 c/s – 4,000 people) [5. P. 43].

The prisoners of the camps carried out excavation, loading and unloading; harvested and exported timber, firewood, sand and stones, shingles and shavings; they worked at the Amurlitmash plant, and were engaged in laying railway tracks and civil engineering. Since 1946, prisoners of war of this camp were involved in the construction of the railway on the Komsomolsk-Amgun section [4].

Most prisoners who entered the camps had various diseases, including epidemic in nature, they were exhausted and sick with dystrophy. The severe Far Eastern climate, poor living conditions, poor nutrition, and physical labor also affected the health of prisoners of war. Therefore, since 1946, health-improving teams were organized in the camp, rest rooms were opened for the best production workers, outpatient clinics (hospitals) were organized at each camp point with the participation of POW doctors. Since that time, special hospitals No. 4923 and 3762 were opened.

Repatriation from the Khabarovsk Territory began already in 1945, when 584 sick and weakened Japanese were sent from Camp No. 5 to their homeland. In total, 28,538 prisoners of war were repatriated from camp No. 5 [5. P. 87]. The last Japanese POWs left the Soviet Union in 1956.

However, not all Japanese POWs managed to return to their homeland. The Certificate on the number of POWs of the former Japanese army captured by Soviet troops in 1945 noted that for the period from 1945 to 1956, 546,752 Japanese were released and repatriated to their homeland, 61,855 people died in captivity [3]. The Japanese who died in captivity were buried near the camps and special hospitals. In the Khabarovsk Territory, in 87 graves, 9,371 Japanese prisoners of war were buried (1).
10 out of 87 cemeteries belonged to camp No. 5 and special hospitals No. 4923 and 3762. 1,053 people were buried in the burial grounds of the camp and special hospitals.

One of these cemeteries was located in the settlement of Gorin along the railway line Urgal-Komsomolsk. The cemetery was opened in October 1945, and in 1947, the Executive committee of the Komsomolsky District Council of Deputies took a decision to expand the cemetery of Japanese POWs and allocated one more plot with the area 300 by 300 meters from the lands of the State Forest Fund close to hospital No. 4923. According to archival documents, 120 people from camp No. 5 and 213 from special hospital 4923 were buried at the site of this cemetery. Of the 213 people who died in the special hospital in 1946 and 1947, one person had the military rank of lieutenant, one person was sergeant major, 18 were senior non-commissioned officers, 13 – non-commissioned officers, 13 – junior non-commissioned officer, 2 – sergeants, 1 – junior sergeant, 2 – senior corporals, 38 – corporals, and 124 – soldiers (1).

Until 1959, the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Khabarovsk Territory carried checks of the state of the cemetery, as well as works on its improvement. However, with the organization of the Gorinsky House of Disabled People (1953), the cemetery site passed into its land use and, due to the construction of new facilities, fell under development. In 1959, the cemetery was liquidated by plowing of the territory. We note that today, next to the existing Gorinsky House of Disabled Persons, there is a grassy area of the former cemetery.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, after the signing in 1991 of the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of Japan on persons who were in prison camps, the Government of Japan has been conducting work on the examination of burials and exhumations of Japanese citizens in the Khabarovsk Territory. From 2002 up till today, in the Khabarovsk Territory, it was possible to exhume, identify, cremate and send to their homeland the remains of 1,604 Japanese troops (1). Of these, 339 bodies were exhumed in the former territory of camp No. 5. 66 bodies were found in the summer of 2017, of which 64 were exhumed by the Japanese delegation in the village of Gorin at the burial grounds of the special hospital 4923. In September 2018, ended another Russian – Japanese expedition to search and exhume Japanese prisoners of war who died in camps after the end of World War II. The ashes of 74 Japanese troops buried in the vicinity of the village of Gorin in the Solnechny District were transported to their historical homeland (1). Traditionally, a group of relatives of the Japanese who died in captivity visited their burial sites in the Khabarovsk Territory to honor the memory of people who died after the war and pray at their graves.

Despite the difficulties in exhuming most of the burials due to the insufficient archival data, the difficulty in physical access to the burial places, work continues on the examination of burial places of the Japanese prisoners of war, the exhumation of their remains and their removal to Japan.
NOTES:
(1) Personal archive Potapova G.N.

REFERENCES:

6. Personal archive of Potapova G.N. Since 1993, she has been organizing direct visits by Japanese delegations, accompanying them on trips around the region, and assisting in the survey of burial places of Japanese citizens.
The article shows discussions around the understanding of the Russian civil identity before the appearance of the “Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025” and during its correction in 2016-2018. The author demonstrates complex content of Russian identity and its compatibility with ethnic identity of the citizens.

Based on the analysis of the sociological polls of 1990s and 2000s, the author claims that the formation of modern Russian identity takes place not only because of the nation-building from “above,” but also spontaneously on the basis of ideas emerging in the mass consciousness.

Data of all-Russian polls by VCIOM, Institute of sociology of FNISC RAS and regional polls show correlation with other collective identities, values and goals which unite the society and problems that have to be overcome in order to strengthen the positive Russian identity.

Key words: Russian civil identity, ethnic (ethnocultural) identity, interethnic accord, solidarity.

Formulation of the problem. The discussion of the Russian identity remains relevant in connection with the tasks of implementing the Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025. But as scientists and acting politicians know, tasks are successfully resolved when they are understood by the people who implement them and are perceived in society. That is why it is important to consider the discussions that took place in connection with the understanding of the Russian identity and the results of the study of its perception in public consciousness.

The collective self-awareness of citizens of the state is not at all an invention of the CPSU ideologists who formulated the concept of the Soviet people, as some scholars continue to say (1).
E. Durkheim wrote about a society where there is a common national civil life and people’s consciousness, based on the idea of equality of citizens before the law, common values, goals and means of their achievement [3. P. 339]. The need for integrating consciousness on the basis of collective ideas and values in society was justified by M. Weber [17. P. 389].

The world and domestic science recognize the socio-psychological concepts of D. Mead and J. Turner on the laws for the formation of identities and the ideas of E. Erickson on the role of the state and ideology in the construction of identity.

Modern states and societies do not exist without their citizens realizing the ties, categorizing them and identifying them. Problems are in the strength of such relations, the grounds on which they are built, the orientation of goals realized by the society.

There is a classic model of civic identity in France, its formation took place after the French Revolution. Germany has its own model of identity, formed in the historical tradition not by territory, but by origin. But at the present stage, in the second half of the 20th century, nationwide integration was based on the idea of adherence to the liberal republican principles.

In Japan, where the search for “who we are” does not stop: whether we are more West or East, a third of citizens still consider birth in the country the criterion of the Japanese nation. Still, recognition of the country’s citizenship is considered the main thing, and the idea of respect for the personal freedom and human rights is recognized as the principle of internal unity [8. S. 113-121; 2. P. 320].

So, Russians are not alone in discussing the content of their identity, nor in the complexity of the search for its foundations. Researchers attribute the emergence of awareness of the community of the Russian people to the XVII-XVIII centuries. As in other countries, historical events, socio-economic and political changes in the country and the world are changing people’s ideas about themselves and the society in which they live. Citizens who live now in Russia survived the crisis of their country and state identity in connection with the collapse of the USSR and changes in public relations.

We will consider the discussions around the Russian civic identity and its perception in the mass consciousness.

**Discussions around the all-Russian identity.** The identity of the citizens of the Russian Federation was difficult to form due to the ambiguity of the all-Russian community. The text of the 1993 Russian Constitution states that it was adopted on behalf of the multinational people of the Russian Federation [15]. This alone gives us reason to consider the Russian community as having not only political, civil, but also multi-ethnic content.

The Concept of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1996, does not contain the concept of “multinational people,” but there is an idea of unity, “spiritual community and union of different peoples.”

The idea of the Russian community has increasingly entered the public space since the beginning of the 2000s. First of all, it was connected with the Messages
of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. In the 2000 Address to the Federal Assembly, the President used the concept of the nation in the national meaning and its derivatives 7 times, and in 2007-2018 [1; 10].

The concept of “nation-state” was worked over in the government structures. We can tell this by the preparation of the Bill “On the Basics of State National Policy” [5] that was supposed to replace the Concept of State National Policy. After discussions at the beginning of 2006, the Bill read that it was adopted “in order to ensure the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation, harmonization of national interests and interests of the peoples of the Russian Federation, and the establishment of an all-Russian identity – the Russian nation.” [6]. But the State Duma postponed the adoption of the Bill.

It was obvious that the historically determined ambiguity and complex character of the Russian identity gave rise to different interpretations. So, the idea was expressed of formation of the nation state (2).

There were ideologists who presented this idea through a special civilization “... for Russia, the political and cultural model is the model of the civilization state ... Russia did not take shape as a civil nation ... The Russian nation is a community of those involved in the formation of state and civilization of Russia. The Russian people is the organic core of this community, and the indigenous peoples loyal to Russia are its full members” [12].

But if the Russian nation is a civilizational community, in the concept of a cultural-historical type according to Danilevsky, then the basis is the Russian people, and, naturally, Orthodoxy. And then what about the “indigenous peoples” loyal to Russia who profess other religions?

In 2007, the “Russian Project” of the Center for Social Conservative Policy appeared. In it, Russians were understood as all citizens of Russia who rally around state power (3). Perhaps these ideas were put forward for the conquest of the electorate during the State Duma elections, because after that they began to leave the public space and the concept of the Russian nation as a combined notion, uniting and including ethnic component was increasingly present.

The concept of the Russian nation was legitimized in the discourse of the President of the Russian Federation. Not only was the term used in the Addresses to the Federal Assembly. At a working meeting on issues of interethnic and interfaith relations on February 5, 2004, V.V. Putin said: “… we have every reason to talk about the Russian people as a united nation. There is … something that unites us all … This is our historical and today’s reality too. Representatives of the most diverse ethnic groups and religions in Russia feel that they are truly a single people.” [11]. But the multiplicity of the Russian nation, including the state, civil and ethnocultural component, gives the basis for specific political forces to rely on one or the other component, and when creating doctrinal documents, the struggle for dominance, as a rule, escalates.

In modern conditions, the Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025 is in effect. It says that the goal of the government nation-
al policy is “to strengthen the all-Russian civil self-consciousness and spiritual community of the multinational people of the Russian Federation.” Among the priority areas of politics it includes: “strengthening the unity and spiritual community of the multinational people of the Russian Federation (Russian nation).” The tasks are set of improving the formation of “all-Russian civic consciousness.”

In October 2016, a meeting of the Council on Interethnic Relations under the President of the Russian Federation was held, it was dedicated to the implementation of the State National Policy Strategy, one of the important issues of which was formation of the civic identity of the Russian nation. As the result of the discussion, President of the Russian Federation gave instructions to prepare a draft normative legal act regulating relations in the field of strengthening the unity of the multinational people of Russia (the Russian nation) [16]. In this regard, discussions unfolded, which returned to the issues discussed since the beginning of the 2000s.

In 2012, when adopting the Strategy for State National Policy for the Period until 2025, the provision of the 1993 Constitution “We are the multinational people of Russia (the Russian nation)” was included as a compromise, primarily with representatives of the republics. They defended it when making adjustments to the Strategy in 2017-2018. But it was not the only difficulty.

When discussing the Russian nation, there were ideologists who argued that the unity of our society is based on the Russian culture, the Russian language and historical memory. Political scientist M.V. Remizov believed that it was not realistic to expect loyalty and patriotism on the basis of the Constitution, legal norms, people’s attitudes to courts, as the civil nation suggests. The basis of “patriotic loyalty,” in his opinion, cannot be the state or territories (4). The people of Russia was opposed by the “Russian nation” as the basis of the national state by the political scientists associated with the Russian Orthodox Church [7].

Specialists of the liberal orientation believed that in the very formulation of the nation of Russia it is necessary to strengthen its civic meaning.

At the Scientific Council on the complex problems of ethnicity and interethnic relations under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, there were proposals to get away from the double interpretation of the nation and to remove the definition of “multinational Russian people (Russian nation)”, leaving only the concept of people of Russia, political nation.

However, during the preparation of the adjustment of the State National Policy Strategy, which was entrusted to the FADN and then discussed in the State Duma, a compromise definition was left: “multinational Russian people (Russian nation)”. The Presidium of the Council on Interethnic Relations under the President of the Russian Federation entrusted the FADN with updating the Strategy for State National Policy, and the scientific Council on the complex problems of ethnicity and interethnic relations under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences defined the main terms that should have been included in the Strategy.
The experts of the RAS and the FADN agreed that at this stage it is possible to define: “The Russian nation is a community of free, equal citizens of the Russian Federation of different ethnic, religious, social and other affiliations, aware of their state and civil unity with the Russian state, of their commitment to the principles and the rule of law, and the need to respect civil rights and obligations.” Corrections, of course, can be introduced in the course of preparing the document for signing by the President of the Russian Federation, but the main meanings will remain.

In accordance with the definition of the Russian nation, Russian identity (civic identity) is citizens’ awareness of belonging to their country, its people, state and society, an understanding of basic values, responsibility for affairs in the country, solidarity in achieving common goals and interests in the development of society and Russian state.

**Russian civic identity in the mass consciousness.** Russian identity (consciousness, as historians and political scientists often say) is not an individual, but a collective identity, it is dynamic and multi-layered.

Answering the poll question “what unites you with the citizens of Russia,” 66% or more of people first of all answered that it is the common state, up to 54% said that it is the common territory, from 47 to 49% of people answered that it is culture (holidays, customs, literature, art), the state language, experienced historical events and 30% said that it is the responsibility for the affairs in country [4. P. 9-24]. Surveys in the republics showed that they identified themselves more often with the state – up to 80%. This gave us reason to call our Russian identity state-civil. So opponents, who see culture as the basis of our common identity, cannot rely on mass public opinion.

The term state-civic identity is often used because another term that would be more consistent with the international standards is national identity, in our country can be understood as an ethnocultural identity.

Since the term nation in ethnocultural meaning and in the meaning of a political nation continue to be used in our country, the term national-civil identity is retained to highlight the all-Russian identity, but judging by media analysis, it is rarely used and more often they simply speak of Russia or Russian civic identity, as suggested by the adjustment of the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025.

In recent years, the all-Russian identity in public opinion has been quite widespread. The empirical basis of the analysis was the results of the all-Russian surveys of the Russian monitoring of the economic situation and public health RLMS-HSE for 2015, VCIOM for 2016 and 2017, and the Institute of Sociology, Federal Scientific Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences for 2015-2017 (5), as well as regional studies of the Center for the Study of Interethnic Relations of the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Scientific and Technical Center of RAS.
According to VCIOM, the Russian identity on average in Russia amounted to 84% in 2017, and people who, according to their estimates, often feel connected or feel a strong connection with Russian citizens, now make up one third of the population. Moreover, among Russians they constitute 35%, and among other nationalities – 44%.

Let us note, that in the early 90s, the first studies of all-Russian consciousness by ethnosociologists of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences carried out in Moscow showed that no more than a quarter of the population associated themselves with the citizens of Russia. In the mid-90s, all-Russian surveys of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Integrated Sociological Research recorded such an identity in 67 to 71% of the population [13. P. 396]. But then, at the official level, no one articulated Russian identity. The use of the term “citizens of Russia” by B. Yeltsin could hardly have produced such an effect. It means that the need for such an identity was in the mass consciousness and its wide distribution in modern conditions is not just the result of constructing it from above.

The fears expressed by the opponents of the “identity of Russians”, who perceived it as a substitute for an ethnonational (ethnocultural) identity, are groundless. Judging by the results of opinion polls, Russian and ethnic identities are combined (see: Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The feeling of connection, unity</th>
<th>Identity Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With people of the same generation</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of the same profession, occupation</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With all Russian citizens</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With residents of your territory, republic, region</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With those who live in the same city, village</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of your nationality</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of the same wealth as you</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people close to you by their political views</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see, ethnic identity remained stable. In 2005 and 2015, from 85 to 91% of Russians felt a connection with the people of their nationality, and from 42 to 48% often felt this connection. And in the trend, this relationship with the
citizens of Russia was not the first among other collective identities, but still it was among the most widespread, mass identities and the most dynamic among them (since 2005 it has grown by 19 percentage points) (see: tab. one). Ethnic and Russian identities have become very close (they differ by 7 percentage points), confirming the conclusion about their compatibility. Naturally, such compatibility is real if each of them is not hyperbolized.

Ethnic sociologists were interested in how strongly people of different nationalities feel Russian identity. Research was conducted in different regions of the Federation. Here we give for example the situation in the Republic of Bashkortostan, where Russians, Bashkirs, and Tatars come into contact and in the Khanty-Mansiysk District of Ugra, where you can also compare the Russians, who constitute an overwhelming majority, as well as the Bashkirs and Tatars.

Among Russians, the proportion of people who feel a strong connection with citizens of Russia and people of their nationality practically do not differ either in Bashkortostan or in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. But among Bashkirs and Tatars, the proportion of people who feel a strong connection with people of their nationality is greater than those who feel such a connection with the citizens of Russia, and this is not very noticeable among Bashkirs in Bashkortostan, but it is quite obvious among Tatars and Bashkirs in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (by 17 percentage points) (see: picture 1).

In general, in Bashkortostan, the Russian identity among the population is almost the same as in the country – 81%, it is even higher in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

In the formation of civic identity, common or different ideas about the goals of the development of society matter, which undoubtedly affects the consolidation of society.

In the interview program for all-Russian and regional studies, we specifically raised the question: “What common goals, in your opinion, could unite Russian society?” We chose the goals that in the all-Russian studies of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (now the Federal Scientific Research Center of RAS) gained more than 25% and tried to track how they are perceived in the regions.

The most frequently chosen goals were “ensuring law and order in the country” and “ensuring the well-being of the people.” This choice was made by respondents in Astrakhan, Kaliningrad, Moscow and Moscow Region, Stavropol Territory, Karelia, and Bashkortostan in the range of 48-60% by region. About 50% of the answers was “ensuring justice in the society” as a highly valuable goal.

Common goals is the resource that solidifies the society. But as we see, the goals desired by our citizens are goals aimed primarily at improving the society.

Some results. Discussions in the elite groups, disunity in ideas about the state-civil or ethno-cultural basis of the Russian identity to some extent affect the consciousness of citizens. It is no coincidence that not everyone joins the identity
Nevertheless, the obvious majority are aware of their civic identity and associate it primarily with the state, the territorial space of the country, and the people of Russia. According to polls, Russian identity does not differ much in social groups and among people with different levels of education. And yet, people with a strong (consolidated) civic identity are more educated and somewhat younger, they more often live in regional centers, they more often trust other people. People with civic identity and, above all, those who feel it, trust the President of the

Picture 1. The feeling of a strong connection with citizens of Russia and according to nationality among people of different nationalities in the Republic of Bashkortostan and in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, % of respondents in 2017-2018

“we are citizens of Russia” (about one fifth do not associate themselves like that). Nevertheless, the obvious majority are aware of their civic identity and associate it primarily with the state, the territorial space of the country, and the people of Russia. According to polls, Russian identity does not differ much in social groups and among people with different levels of education. And yet, people with a strong (consolidated) civic identity are more educated and somewhat younger, they more often live in regional centers, they more often trust other people. People with civic identity and, above all, those who feel it, trust the President of the
Russian Federation and the Government of the country to a considerable degree (by 24 and 15 percentage points).

Among them, there are slightly more of those who “would like to be useful to the state and society” (52% versus 41% in the all-Russian sample), who feel love, pride and respect for today’s Russia (75% against 55% among those who do not feel such a connection), they are more tolerant, and more often share the opinion that “Russia is a common home for all peoples” (51% against 44%).

Russian identity, as we have shown, was born from below, it is only stimulated from above, this explains its wide distribution. The problems remain in its substantial filling it with elements of citizenship: encouraging citizens to comply with the rule of law, increasing the level of trust in society, citizens’ responsibility for affairs in the country (now it is felt by 30 to 50% by region), increasing the legitimacy of government institutions, overcoming the imbalance of views regarding human rights and minority groups whose discrimination is unacceptable under the Constitution.

The actualization of ethnic identity in the country remains high. According to the 2018 polls, 82% agreed with the opinion “I never forget about my nationality” (including 86% of Russians who said so) and 43% agreed with the saying “all means are good for protecting the interests of my people.” Consequently, maintaining interethnic harmony remains an essential factor in civic integration and strengthening of Russian identity.

The provision of the country’s Constitution on the equal rights of peoples is not yet accepted by all citizens. All-Russian polls show that no more than half of the people share the opinion that in the country people of all nationalities should have equal rights, and in the republics (Bashkortostan, Karelia, Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan and others) it is shared by 80 to 90%, including Russians. This is an obvious risk. Society and the state have to overcome it.

Russian civic identity requires further scientific development. It is important to implement these developments in the educational environment, the Internet community, and the media. The positive development of Russian identity, its civic component, is possible only through joint efforts of the state and society.

NOTES:


(2) Such ideas, for example, were voiced during debates in discussions at the Liberal Mission Foundation // http://www.liberal.ru/sitan.asp?Rel=92

(3) The organizers of the project were Ivan Demushkin, Nizrat Isaev, journalist Mikhail Leontyev from United Russia, from the Orthodox magazine “Foma” Vladimir Legoyda.
(4) TV channel Culture. Release of the program “What to do?” of December 12, 2016. “Do the peoples of Russia and the Russian people in particular need a law “on the Russian nation?”


REFERENCES:


4. Drobizheva L.M., Ryzhova S.V. Civil and ethnic identity and the image of the desired state in Russia [Grazhdanskaya i etnicheskaya identichnost’ i obraz zhelatemyego gosudarstva v Rossii] // Policy. Political research. 2015. No. 5 (In Russ.).


11. Putin V.V. Speech at a working meeting on issues of interethnic and interfaith relations [Vystupleniye na rabochey vstreche po voprosam mezhnatsional’nykh i mezhkonfessional’nykh otnosheniy]. Cheboksary, February 5, 2004 // http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22349 (In Russ.).


E.T. MEKHDIEV
Ph.D., Researcher of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN AZERBAIJAN: THE CASE OF A RENEWABLE ENERGY

Improved energy efficiency is a key component of modern energy systems – can lead to abundant, cheap and clean energy. It can also be a key policy mechanism for reducing energy costs, promoting sustainable economic development for social growth and improving productivity. In general, this applies to households, industry and the transport sector. It can also be a key policy mechanism for reducing energy costs, promoting sustainable economic development for social growth and improving productivity. The article addresses a range of key issues such as assessing energy efficiency potential, progress and problems. It evaluates national legislation and policies regarding energy efficiency, mechanisms and programs in Azerbaijan with the main focus on renewable energy. The article provides a broader picture of the experience of Azerbaijan, as well as setting potential perspectives for future collaboration in the field of energy efficiency in order to reduce energy costs and emissions, as well as increase export capacities and build a green economy.

Key words: energy efficiency, export, foreign policy, economy, renewable energy sources, Azerbaijan.

1. Introduction. As an integral part of sustainable energy policy, energy efficiency policies and measures are important for sustainable economic development. In the context of volatile energy prices and growing scarcity of energy resources, both prosperity and competitiveness are increasingly dependent on energy efficiency. In fact, improved energy efficiency is a key component of modern energy systems – can lead to abundant, cheap and clean energy. It can also be a key policy mechanism for reducing energy costs, promoting sustainable economic development for social growth and improving productivity. In general, this applies to households, industry and the transport sector.

This article addresses a range of key issues such as assessing energy efficiency potential, progress and problems. It evaluates national legislation and policies regarding energy efficiency, tools, activities and programs in Azerbaijan.
with the main focus on renewable energy. The article provides a broader picture of the experience of Azerbaijan, as well as setting potential perspectives for future collaboration. It must be noted that in terms of energy consumption, Azerbaijan is focused on energy efficiency improvement measures in order to reduce energy costs and emissions, as well as increase export capacities and build green economy. The country also aims to increase the share of renewable in electricity generation and total energy consumption. To this extent, renewable energy will provide reliable sources, as the country will increase investment in this sector and successfully use this power in electricity production.

The research question is how successfully find an alternative and sustainable source of energy in Azerbaijan in order to prevent the ever increasing usage of fossil fuels that can lead to shortage in future, as well as to contribute to developing of a green economy and building a new low-carbon development model in Azerbaijan.

The article is divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the national legislation, policies and current challenges regarding energy efficiency in Azerbaijan, explaining the necessary conditions for determinations whether the country is committed to energy efficiency improvement measures aimed at reducing energy costs and emissions, and increasing export capacity and energy savings. The second chapter examines the institutional framework, dealing with the governmental bodies of the Republic of Azerbaijan tasked with the implementation of state policy and regulation in the country’s fuel and energy complex, as well as develop national economic policy and assess sustainable energy potential of the country. The third chapter highlights the importance of a renewable energy for a long-term perspective in Azerbaijan in regard to the global and national framework for Azerbaijan’s national economy and a new green low-carbon development model.

2. Institutional framework as a new challenge. The central executive body tasked with the implementation of state policy and regulation in the country’s fuel and energy complex is the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Ministry is mainly responsible for the supervision, regulation and control of the efficient use of the fuel and energy complex, issuance of special permissions (licenses) in cases provided for by legislation, preparation of the annual fuel and energy balance, preparation and implementation of state programs on the development of the industry and energy sectors, coordination of the activities of state-owned enterprises operating in the relevant field, or entities that have a controlling part of the shares at state-ownership. It also participates in the preparation of international agreements on industry and energy cooperation, ensures the implementation of international agreements, and coordinates the work done in this area [4]. The Ministry works closely with the Ministry of Economy and Industry, State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Azerenerji JSC and other related state institutions.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Economy and Industry is a central executive body that develops national economic policy, provides economic and social forecasts, and designs and implements state policy for economic development. It also builds, foreign economic and trade contacts, raises, allocates and promotes investments, internal trade, entrepreneurship, competition (including elimination of unfair competition, protecting consumer rights and regulating the structure and innovations in the national economy), as well as regulating and exercising official control over issues within its sphere of activity. The Ministry’s main role in the energy sector is to participate in the development of mechanisms ensuring efficient use of power resources and the energy budget.

The central executive body in the field of renewable energy and energy efficiency is the State Agency for Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources (SAARES), the principal regulatory institution in the sphere of alternative and renewable energy which is tasked with assessing sustainable energy potential, shaping relevant policies (including tariff policy), expanding and enforcing relevant procedures, such as issuing special permissions to public and private entities for the construction of power generation facilities.

Additionally, in order to speed up and coordinate work more effectively, “Azalternativenerji” Ltd. was established by the State Agency. Its key focus includes generation, transportation and distribution of power, equipment for power generation, design of units and facilities, manufacturing, construction and operation of facilities as well as activities related to infrastructure. “The National Strategy for the Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources for the period of 2012-2020” is another important goal for which the Agency is responsible. It will identify the main areas of renewables, develop a regulatory framework and stimulate activity in this field [5].

In order to use oil resources in accordance with a consistent national policy, improve the management structure of the oil industry, and develop the energy industry the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) was established in the Republic of Azerbaijan. SOCAR is involved in exploring oil and gas fields, producing, processing, and transporting oil, gas, and gas condensate, marketing petroleum and petrochemical products in domestic and international markets, and supplying natural gas to industry and the public in Azerbaijan. Three production divisions, two oil refineries and one gas processing plant, an oil tanker fleet, a deep water platform fabrication yard, two trusts, one institution, and 22 subdivisions are operating as corporate entities under SOCAR. Joint ventures (including in Georgia and Turkey), consortia, and operating companies established with SOCAR’s participation are doing business in different parts of the petroleum industry. SOCAR has representative offices in Georgia, Turkey, Romania, Austria, Switzerland, Kazakhstan, Great Britain, Iran, Germany and Ukraine and trading companies in Switzerland, Singapore, Vietnam, Nigeria, and other countries [24. P. 1-2]. In total, SOCAR has 24 structures that deal with various spheres such as production, refinery, marketing, geology, and transportation.
Additionally, SOCAR’s “Azerigaz” Production Union transmits, distributes, and markets natural gas in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The syndicate also transports SOCAR gas to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Georgia, and the Russian Federation. The total volume of gas transported annually by the syndicate inside and outside the country is 12.6 billion m$^3$. By supplying natural gas to all of the country’s fossil fuel power plants in the country, “Azerigaz” plays a significant role in the development of the country’s electrical power industry. Six production divisions and organizations are consolidated in the “Azerigaz” Production Union [24. P. 1-2].

“AzerEnergy” JSC is the country’s largest power producer and also holds the leading position in number and length of distribution networks and TL. It is the biggest organization in its sphere in terms of production, transmission, distribution and supply of electric power and thermal electric power. In addition, it was formerly responsible for the national grid and electricity supply across Azerbaijan (with the exception of Baku, which is supplied by Bakielektrikshabaka (BES) JSC) [12]. However, pursuant to a Presidential order (February 2015) Bakielektrikshebeke JSC (electricity distribution in Baku) was renamed Azerishig JSC. According to this order, the role of Azerenerji JSC in providing consumers with electricity was transferred to Azerishig JSC. Through the purchase and sale of electricity, Azerishig JSC will be engaged in ensuring reliable, safe and effective electricity supplies to consumers, using new technologies, modernizing its technical base, and other activities aimed at developing this sector.

3. Renewable energy: a long-term perspective. A clean energy revolution is taking place across the globe underscored by the steady expansion of the renewable energy sector based on the utilization of solar, wind, geothermal and bioenergy sources. The clean energy industry generates hundreds of billions in economic activity, and is expected to continue to grow rapidly in the coming years. There is tremendous economic opportunity for the countries that invent, manufacture and export clean energy technologies [12].

Use of renewable energy sources by different countries varies depending on location as well as regional characteristics. For instance, the use of photovoltaic panels is widespread in Germany and Israel. Israel plans to increase the share of renewables to 10% of electricity generation by 2020. The installed capacity for solar domestic hot water supply in this country is high. Germany has achieved great success in using solar and wind power in electricity production. The share of solar power in the country’s electricity production rose to 6.9% (32.4 TWh), and the share of wind power was equal to 42.6 TWh during the first eleven months of 2014.

The national renewable energy policy of Azerbaijan is set forth in “The State Program on Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources (2005-2013)” which focuses on diversifying the sources of primary energy and ensuring energy security, in particular with reference to small hydropower and wind power potential in order to improve access to energy in rural and remote areas. The govern-
Energy Efficiency in Azerbaijan: the Case of a Renewable Energy

Government is committed to creating a long term legal framework, and is implementing various policies to attract investment. The preparation of a ‘National Strategy on the Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources for the years 2012-2020’ by SAARES and the Ministry of Energy marks an important step in this direction. Azerbaijan’s 2020 targets include the following:

1) Identification of potential of renewable/alternative energy sources;
2) Increased energy efficiency;
3) Creation of new employment opportunities; and
4) 20% share of RE in electricity;
5) 9.7% share of RE in all energy consumption;
6) 2,000 MW of installed RES capacity by 2020.

According to the Strategy, the government intends to increase the share of renewable energy sources to 9.7% of total energy consumption by 2020, which is about three times higher than today’s indicator.

Figure 3 reveals the key sources of renewable energy with regard to the 2020 target. Within this context, onshore and offshore wind farms/clusters, solar power, hydro and biomass/solid wastes will be priorities.

The potential for solar and wind power generation contains a special significance. The possibilities for wind power development are very strong in Azerbaijan, especially on the Absheron peninsula, the Caspian coastline where the wind speed ranges from 7.9 to 8.1 m/sec. The Western region of the country (Ganja-Daskesen) and Nakhchivan AR (Sharur-Julfa) offer ideal conditions for the efficient operation of wind turbines. The country has around 800 MW of wind power potential, which could mean roughly 2.4 billion kWh of electricity or up to 1 million tons of standard fuel saving [22].

Figure 3: RES target for 2020
Azerbaijan’s climate conditions are also offers major potential for the production of electric and heat energy via solar power. The efficiency of solar stations depends on a country’s climate and geography. For example, in Azerbaijan the possibilities for the solar power development are strong in the Absheron peninsular as well as in Nakhchivan AR and the Mil-Mughan region. The annual number of sunshine hours in the country is equal to 2400-3200 hours, equal to 1500-2000 kWh/m² annually [22].

In order to stimulate use of alternative and renewable energy sources, the following important measures have also been taken:

1) Presidential Decree (2001) “On privatization of small Hydroelectric Power Plants” was approved, and operational small hydropower plants such as Sheki, Mughan, Zeykhur, Gusar, Nyugedi, Chinarly, Balakan, Guba and Zurnabad were offered for privatization;

2) Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2005) on imports of wind appliances and their parts are exempt from customs duties and VAT.

Furthermore, according to Tariff Council, the wholesale price of electricity produced by private small hydropower stations (i.e. hydropower stations with a generation capacity of 50 to 10000 kW) is 0.025 AZN per kW/hour. The wholesale price of electricity produced by wind power stations is 0.045 AZN. There is also a feed-in tariff for wind-based electricity (some 10% higher than the regular tariff). Regular tariffs apply to all other RES-based plants (for private small HPPs the tariff is even lower) [23]. However, despite the huge potential for renewable energy, the share of renewables in electricity was 10% (9.8% hydropower and 0.2% other RE), and in total, energy consumption was 2.3% in 2011.

It also important to mention the existing barriers to development of renewable energy in Azerbaijan, which include:

1) Weak legal framework as well as supporting instruments, and under-promotion of development of renewable energy sources. Existing laws and measures do not attract foreign investors. In order to attract significant private investment in this sector, the adoption of additional measures including larger feed-in tariffs and fiscal incentives as well as smoothing and facilitation of administrative procedures is highly recommended;

2) Insufficient financial and credit mechanism for purchase and installation of renewable energy sources technologies (lack of new technologies and the high cost of existing tools);

3) Poor public awareness; people lack information about the economic prospects and competitiveness of the industry; and

4) Shortage of experienced specialists in this sphere [17].

It is also worth noting that the government already considers development of renewable energy as one of the key objectives of the state energy policy. To this end, SAARES, the principal regulatory institution in the sphere of alternative and
renewable energy, was established in Azerbaijan. It collaborates with the European Commission, UNDP, IRENA World Bank and Asian Development Bank to promote the development of sustainable energy in Azerbaijan. One key project is the Experimental Polygon and Training Center in Gobustan, which provides special training to employees on the implementation of alternative energy technologies, with 5.5 MW installed capacity of hybrid sources – wind (2.7 MW), solar (1.8 MW) and biogas (1 MW). Another important project is the Azguntech solar panel producing plant in Sumgayit, established by SAARES, which produces 120,000 solar panels a year [7. Pp. 15-17, 48-49]. The Agency is also the central implementing institution of “the National Strategy for the Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources for the period of 2012-2020”. In fact, the successful implementation of the National Strategy will contribute to developing of a green economy, building a new low-carbon development model in Azerbaijan.

4. Conclusion. A green economy, according to the United Nations environment programme, is one that “results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities”. While seemingly altruistic, the concept is by no means unrealistic. Its viability is substantially improved by innovations in renewable energy, arguably the lifeblood of a sustainable economy [18].

Undoubtedly, renewable energy is clean energy which helps decrease emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Increasing the use of renewable energy sources will enhance viability of the energy systems and will also enhance energy delivery. Thus, renewable energy sources will reduce dependency on the use of fossil fuel and energy sources that damage the environment [13].

Today Azerbaijan is experiencing a new energy transition. The analyzed in this article statistics and recent achievements speak for themselves. By all indications, it’s reasonable to predict that the share of renewables in Azerbaijan will grow exponentially, an encouraging sign for the creation of sustainable economy. Moreover, this trend occurs in all around the globe. Thus, the International Energy Agency has predicted that as much as 25 per cent of the world’s gross power generation will come from renewable energy sources by 2018, the obvious by-product being increasingly widespread sustainable energy generation [18].

In this respect, the Azerbaijani government should focus on policies and mechanisms that will promote more environmentally sound and sustainable economy. Furthermore, the private sectors should also be encouraged to meet the sustainable development standards for maximum impact in the society and state economy.

As a direct result of renewables beginning to account for even larger portions of energy being produced, national state on its way towards fulfilling two of the three criteria required for a green economy: a low carbon footprint and the effi-
Scientific use of natural resources. Clean energy, in its role as an enabler of economic growth and development, will serve as a catalyst for the third aspect: employment and social inclusion [18].

In fact, driven by the stable economics and unprecedented reliability, countries like Azerbaijan are leading the way with investments in clean energy. What is significant is that these investments – both in Azerbaijan and around the world – are not simply being seen as a means of complying with national legislation and state strategy. They are able to address critical energy needs, reinforcing the fact that renewable energy sources have truly come of age as a reliable and affordable ones, aiming of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with conventional power generators.

REFERENCES:


3. A.S. Nada Renewable energy will power the green economy, innovation will drive it, The National // https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/renewable-energy-will-power-the-green-economy-innovation-will-drive-it-1.264720.


5. Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin 2013-cü il 1 fevral tarixli Fərməni ilə təsdiq edilmiş ‘Azərbaycan Respublikasının Alternativ və Bərpa Olunan Enerji Mənbələri üzrə Dövlət Agentliyi haqqinda Əsasnamə’.


19. Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Studies prepared under the project “Promoting Green Economy in GUAM Countries: Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources” Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, 2014.


REVIEW OF L. F. BOLTENKOVA’S ARTICLE
“HISTORICAL BASIS OF RUSSIANNESS”

The subject (sphere) of L. F. Boltenkova’s research is “Russianness” (being Russian). Not holding back emotions, under the impression of the article’s content and inherent meanings, I want to exclaim: surely it is a quality, it is changeable and elusive, it means to belong to the nation and Russia, the state and the world system, and even the Russian world. Can one term contain all that and be a concept? And is this “Russianness”? It is necessary to agree without any equivocation – this is a bold attempt by Professor L. F. Boltenkova to reflect on the metaphysics and dialectics of the concept of “Russianness,” to reveal the author’s understanding of Russianness, its forms, origins and historical foundations. It is a bold and worthy plan for a researcher and we can only bow down, recognizing such an impulse in the scientific field. Bold and worthy since the researcher has entered the path of intellectual competition and competition with other interpreters of this phenomenon.

There are many examples today expanding the discussion on this issue in a different perspective and under different meanings, trying to explain not on the language of “Russianness,” but for example on the language of “russocentrism,” resulting in a new logical chains in the form of a “new Imperial history.” Thus offering and presenting an analytical language for deconstructing the traditional “scheme of Russian history” and the role of the subjects of history, who have acquired the very substance that can only be expressed by “Russianness.”

The search for and explanation of the historical foundations of Russianness, around which L. F. Boltenkova leads her story, is the same movement in the lines of converging and diverging circles, concerning the true patriotism and chauvinism, Russianness and anti-Russianness, which walk side by side and often come out of one another. Checking the meanings of such concepts has also become perceived as a key point in the long practice of dividing the old common Russian world, splitting United Russia into Eastern and Western, and today – into Russia and ANTI-Russia. It is today that the concept of this very anti-Russianness is be-
ing formed in the nationalist imagination with a tenacity worthy of the most well-trained students from teachers and followers of anti-rusticity. This is no longer the mysticism and nonsense of the ideas of politicians and politicians, when they change the nature of the unified Russian people’s essence, using the language of this essence, repeating more than once: “goodbye unwashed Russia....”

The separation from the natural essence of Russian is being conducted on all fronts and directions. The blow is applied to the Russian language, prohibiting it, or leaving it only for the household communication, or by changing the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. They also hit the deepest foundations of Russianness-the Orthodox faith and the Church. It is difficult, even impossible, to break away from the essence and nature of Russianness, but today the destroyers believe that it is necessary to break away and they do break.

You can already exhale on this cycle, and on this logical chain of knowledge and explanation. No! L. F. Boltenkova goes further in her reflections than it seemed to be possible in the primary perception of the text. You can already exhale on this cycle, and on this logical chain of knowledge and explanation. No! L. F. Boltenkova goes further in her reflections than it seemed to be possible in the primary perception of the text. You can already exhale on this cycle, and on this logical chain of knowledge and explanation. No! L. F. Boltenkova goes further in her reflections than it seemed to be possible in the primary perception of the text. You can already exhale on this cycle, and on this logical chain of knowledge and explanation. No! L. F. Boltenkova goes further in her reflections than it seemed to be possible in the primary perception of the text. You can already exhale on this cycle, and on this logical chain of knowledge and explanation. No! L. F. Boltenkova goes further in her reflections than it seemed to be possible in the primary perception of the text. In the author’s work, everything is more complicated and different, since the historical soil of Russia is different from the philosophical or only political soil. L. F. Boltenkova directly says: “... we are not talking about this, but about Russianness, because everything connected with the history of Russia – the USSR – the Russian Federation-revolves around this Phenomenon.” This may not be the first, but it is a frank and clear position and a desire to develop a new language, new meanings of historical realities, to describe the phenomenon in new and old terms and comprehend modern history and politics, the current and future political process and life both within Russia and abroad.

The author of the article, of course, had the possibility of a different approach in choosing the object and subject of research, and methods of analysis. Russia and the Russians as an object-subject area of research provide the widest scope for analysis, in approaches, concepts, theories, and models of cognition. With a little imagination, the author of the article could have made a broad research of the political leadership of Russ-Russia without any restrictions. Or of such concepts as: Russia – Europe; Russia and Russians-underdeveloped Europe; Russia-a special part of Europe; Russia-anti-West; Russia-East, Russia-periph-
eral civilization or Russia – a gunpowder empire. But the article consciously and deliberately restricts this very subject area. It is now subject to the deciphering of various historical and political meanings and ideas, the explanation and interpretation of the historical phenomenon and process through the introduction into scientific circulation, the logic of research analysis is not very common in the special literature, and even through the controversial term – Russianness. It is well known in the scientific community that the conceptual apparatus is a highly complex and highly obscure metaphysics. The transition of quantity to quality in an abstract-theoretical presentation is so dark that you will not understand anything. Thinking and searching for precise definitions is associated with the calculation of large and infinitesimal quantities, figuring out the values not only symbolic, abstract, but also real, when they reach an incredible sharpness in problematization – political, ideological. When propagandizing the transmission of information and meanings of various stories and events. Not a game of words and imagination, but real events of recent history made L. F. Boltenkova include in her text and the logic of her analysis stories about the collapse of the Soviet Union, about satisfaction of special (or even just national) Russian interests, or for the sake of nationalization of the life in the republics, except the RSFSR, plans on the creation of the Russian Republic at the time “when Russianness was almost abandoned.” Now all who wants to know is aware, and we need to be aware that behind such actions there is an activity for special purposes. Repeated and frequent goals in history create an idea that sometimes acquires absolute power and expresses the law of history and politics. And all these goals are just tools that implement specific ideas.

The logic of L. F. Boltenkova’s research, as it seems to us, is opposed to those ideas that consider it logical and consistent to believe that the origins of the formation and subsequent development of the Russian state did not have any previous traditions of organized political life, which were created by those who already then, in times immemorial, acquired Russianness.

The supporters of the enduring value of globalism believe it natural and necessary to involve native Russian territories, spaces, and ethnicities in a spontaneous form of globalization. It seems that there is no point in arguing with this logic. It would be rash to get involved in such an argument. Russia was and remains the country and state with the largest territory with a multi-ethnic indigenous population. But this logical construction is followed by a system of meanings around nationalism, Russian nationalism and great-power chauvinism. The idea of hidden conflicts between the state-forming ethnic group and minorities is being imposed. It is proposed to use such patterns of thinking to develop discussions on understanding differences and group identity, to completely free oneself from the narratives of “indigenous people,” “ethnic solidarity” or “state interests.” Arguing with such judgments and statements, answering such questions and anticipating their viability L. Boltenkova again declares, like she did 20 years ago: “the Lord saved
Russia by abolishing the USSR. You need not perceive the abolition of the USSR as a historical tragedy. It is better to look at this event as an opportunity to revive Russia and the Russian as well, as a condition for increasing the historical role of all the peoples of the former Russian Empire, including the Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Udmurts – all those who now make up the Russian Federation.”

An academic and heuristic attention does not weaken, on the contrary, it grows to Russia and Russians. In what forms and with what content is this manifested in the structures of culture, history, politics, and ethno-politics, in the relations of the Russian world with other systems, between peoples and states, and political elites? The palliatives of forms and the kaleidoscope of shades in the content seem to be defined in terms of multiplicity and uncertainty. But this is not so, because it is already obvious and even clear, already transparent, but not yet explicable the drama and tragedy in the emerging relations between Russians and Ukrainians. Or more precisely, between Russia and the ruling elite of Ukraine, between Russian and Ukrainian nationalists, among whom there are a lot of ethnic Russians, who should carry something natural to them in Spirit and Flesh, this something does not have an exact definition in the form of a term, on which any science is based. Grown from the same root, two peoples, Russian and Ukrainians, today began their way to their history, to learn the lessons of experience of their ancestors, to satisfy the natural urge to be themselves and also to satisfy their thirst for definitions of their self and identity in the space of their native habitat and maintain vital national forces. There are those who have emigrated today, left Russia and splashed across the cities and territories of Europe and America. Can we consider them Russians or related to Russianness? But they still consider themselves as carriers of Russian culture and art, uniting around the forum of Russian Culture “Slovonovo” and the ideas of “Russia without shores.”

In determining the approaches to the disclosure and description of the research topic, the author considers it sufficient to indicate that historically the closest sources of increased attention to Russians and Russia were elitist and mass moods of coveted satisfaction in connection with the disappearance from the geopolitical space of the USSR. The continuation of these sentiments and the resulting satisfaction, in turn, raised hopes for some to become the only world Leader, and for others to separate themselves from Russia with the support of this very Leader. This process is described by the author of the article in the context of “perception” of the unexpected “collapse of the USSR”. The author seems to wonders what provokes this most increased attention to Russia and Russianness. In her answer we find the explanation: it is not only inadequate understanding of the historical process, but, more significantly, in terms of the research, is inadequately understood course of history with the Russian identity and its role in the world: “the Russian question is discussed actively, but is still unresolved and the Russian character remains a mystery.”
Now the author’s research is narrowed to such limits as to focus on the definition of Russianness. Realizing that the concept is not a direct reflection of the truth, the author of the article uses nine elements of its main and secondary features. Without touching on the properties of each of these features, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.

First, by presenting Russianness as a phenomenon, the author insists on recognizing it as an enduring reality which at the same time has the logic of its historical development. Together with the author of the article, we can state that when this phenomenon is given, the practice that demonstrated the originality and specificity of historical time becomes more attractive. Different tribes in the prehistoric period and at the dawn of the formation of statehood already called themselves Rus. In our presentation, the logic of this approach will allow us to develop ideas about the strengths of Russianness. Russian history, at least, shows that there is clear and undeniable evidence that the energy and potential of Russianness, Russian Land was so strong that both the Varangians and other subjects of that history identified themselves with Russians. Russian world was created in this way, in which everyone considered themselves to be Russian.

Secondly, the author is dialectical in her judgments and in the recognition of dialectics in the evolution of the phenomenon of Russian. Russianness evolved, developed, acquiring new properties that complemented and updated the signs of this phenomenon, forming a complete essence of the phenomenon. This author’s type of thinking and description of events and processes is adequately reflected in the historical process, thereby enriching the foundations of Russian language. Russian language divided into two dialects (South Russian and Pskov-Novgorod), this lasted for more than three centuries, by the end of the XVI century, Russians in Russia and Russians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth no longer considered themselves a single people. The subsequent history of the development of Russianness as a phenomenon has become even more complicated, gaining, on the one hand, resistance to self-preservation, and on the other, testing itself for strength, and in this development, strengthening and weakening it reached the extreme limits. The modernity of Russianness is going through another stage to test its viability. It is difficult to give any precise and strict description of the qualitative parameters of Russianness at the present time, but so far it is possible to clearly observe signs of its dilapidation, wait-and-see tactics and slow accumulation of spiritual and other tangible forces and energy.

The work of Professor L. F. Boltenkova led us to these considerations, which are the most general and do not claim to be true. Her thoughts have almost physical force and allow you to add to the above statement:

First, the problem of Russianness has a whole heap of large and small immanent dimensions in it. But today, in connection with the changing algorithm of the world order and the functioning of the Russ (or Russian) ethnic group and the three peoples of the three sovereign states, the contradictions of preserving or
reviving Russian identity have become more than acute. Against the background of the apparent and real loss of the life potential, the ideas of defeat or rebirth of the carriers of Russianness may prevail. That is why we believe that two major issues and two agendas of intellectual attention have become topical: a) the circle and the list of contradictions to maintain the historical traditions of Russianness and their transformation, even the update in the internal structure of modern Russian community and state; b) prolongation of Russianness on the basis of almost antagonistic contradictions between one race (Russian) and the disintegration of this race into three independent nations (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians) who formed their own states. These are the only foundations of the present and future of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. The three countries have a common history and there are no natural obstacles on the border territories and directly on the borders. It is impossible to detect under the microscope the distinctive features between Russia and Ukraine. But today, there are still no natural obstacles, but there are signs of insurmountable borders on the borders of these two states, which also divide two similar peoples. Impassable borders are created artificially and in the name of selfish goals and interests of narrow groups within countries and beyond. What was the basis of this transformation? Ukrainian historian P. Tolochko gives a clear answer: “In all cases, the motive is the desire to consider it (our history) exclusively through the Ukrainian ethnic prism...” We, all of us, who are carriers of Russianness, accept and listen to these words sensitively. Russianness is not history, politics or culture through the Russian ethnic prism. This is not a prism of Russian ethnic patriotism. This is the prism of Russianness, woven into a single wreath of history, statesmanship, religiosity, loyalty to cultural codes, and the civic sense of all those who consider themselves the bearers of Russian culture, statehood, and morality. Russianness is not a “call of blood,” but an unconditional love for the native land and service to it.
OUR AUTHORS

**Bessonova T.V.** – Candidate of Sciences (history), Associate Professor, Naberezhnye Chelny Institute of Kazan (Volga) Federal University, Naberezhnye Chelny, Russia.

**Drobizheva L.M.** – Dr.Sci. (Hist.), Chief-researcher, Head of the Center for Research of Interethnic Relations, Institute of Sociology FNISC RAS, Professor-researcher, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.

**Medvedev N.P.** – Doctor of Sciences (political sciences), Professor, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia.

**Mekhdiev E.T.** – Ph.D., Researcher of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies of the Institute of international studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia.

**Panteleev V.I.** – Candidate of Sciences (history), Associate Professor at the Chair of Logistics and Marketing in the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Krasnoyarsk State Agrarian University, Krasnoyarsk, Russia.

**Potapova I.V.** – Candidate of Sciences (history), Associate Professor, Khabarovsk, Russia.

**Slisovskiy D.E.** – PhD in History, Professor of Department of Humanities and social Sciences, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), Moscow, Russia.

**Voronov I.I.** – Doctor of Sciences (history), Professor at the Chair of History and Regional Studies, St. Petersburg State University of Telecommunications named after M.A. Bonch-Bruevich, St. Petersburg, Russia.
AUTHORS’ GUIDELINES

1. Topic of the article shall correspond to the review’s profile. The submitted text may be written by one or several authors. The materials shall be topical and of academic and practical value.

2. The number of pages for articles written by post-graduate students and persons working for PhD degree shall not exceed 10 typed pages and by PhDs or DScs – 12 typed pages. All texts shall be typed in font: Times New Roman, size 14, interval between the lines: 1.5 lines. All sources shall be specified by bibliographic references.

3. References are to be given in the text in square brackets, inside of which the first figure indicates the number of the source in the references list, the second one, following the capital letter “P”, indicates the page number in the source (for example, [1. P. 126]; references to several sources – [1. P. 126; 4. P. 43]). References to footnotes are to be given in round brackets, for example, (1).

4. All the tables, diagrams, graphs, and drawings are to be incorporated in the text of the article. They are to be numbered and supplied with a title. Tables are to be given a title placed above the table, drawings are to have captions. When several tables and/or drawings are used in the article, their numeration is obligatory.

5. Formulas are to be marked out, explained and provided with references.

6. The manuscript must include a list of references submitted in accordance with the Vancouver style of the AMA version.

7. It is obligatory to attach the following to the manuscript:
   - abstract (summary); the abstract should disclose the issues contained in the scientific article, its purpose and the obtained results. Recommended annotation structure: introduction, aims and objectives, methods, results and conclusions. The information contained in the title of the article should not be repeated in the abstract. Historical information, description of the previously published and well-known facts shall not be included in the abstract. The recommended volume of the abstract is from 200 to 250 words;
   - a list of 7-8 key terms;
   - information about the author, including: the author’s full name, the official name of the place of employment, position, scientific degree, as well as the author’s contact data – mailing address, telephone number (office, mobile), electronic address; the number of co-authors cannot be more than four.

The decision as to publication is made within four months from the day the manuscript is registered at the editorial office. Materials which are not accepted for publication will not be returned. The editors will not enter into correspondence with the authors in case of refusal to publish the articles submitted by them.

The authors will bear full responsibility for the selection and authenticity of the given facts, quotations, statistical and sociological data, proper names, geographical names and other information.

The published materials may not reflect the viewpoint of the editorial board and the editors.
The author, submitting a manuscript to the editors, undertakes not to have it published, either in full or partially, in any other publication without the editors’ consent.

The published issues and abstracts of the articles are available on the website of the journal: http://voprospolitolog.ru/index.php/ru/political-science-issues

E-mail address: etnopolitolog@yandex.ru